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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION
Arthur R. Wyatt, a former member of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), stated (1977) that the
FASB should be more aware of the economic consequences of
proposed accounting standards so it can be prepared to meet
opposition.

Economic consequences arise from contracting

and monitoring costs associated with contractual agreements
(e.g., lending agreements) and political costs (e.g.,
taxation, regulation, and antitrust legislation) (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986).

The FASB must anticipate concerns of its

constituents about the economic consequences of accounting
changes if it expects to build support for these changes
(Saemann, 1987).
Recently, the FASB has been further criticized by
various sources concerning the standards and the standards
setting process (Chaney and Jeter, 1989; and Ihlanfeldt,
1991).

There has been dissension over the economic

consequences of several recent FASB exposure drafts and
related standards.

The FASB received many objections over

the absence of practical considerations in FASB Statement
No. 87, "Employers' Accounting for Pensions" (Wyatt, 1990).
A related topic, "Employers' Accounting for Postretirement
Benefits Other Than Pensions," (OPEB) Statement No. 106
1
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released in December of 1990, received much criticism during
the comment period of the related exposure draft (FASB,
1990).

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to explain and classify
the behavior of corporate managers1 in the accounting
standards setting process as it related to OPEB in order to
provide insight for developing a more effective process.
This study examined two decisions made by management: (1)
the decision whether or not to participate in lobbying
activities during the comment period of the OPEB exposure
draft; and (2) the position taken on the OPEB exposure
draft.
This study compared the results of surveys of two
groups of corporate representatives— those who filed
written comments with the FASB on its exposure draft,
"Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other
Than Pensions," and a sample of corporate representatives
who did not file comments on that exposure draft.

The

sample of nonfilers was selected from corporations that
provide postretirement benefits other than pensions and are
in industry categories similar to corporations whose
representatives filed comment letters with the FASB.

The

1 In this study corporate managers are assumed to
express the position of their employers in regard to
proposed financial reporting standards.
2
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results of the surveys were analyzed in an attempt to
determine the reasons why the filers decided to lobby and
the nonfilers decided not to lobby.

The survey of nonfilers

requested information as to the corporate position on the
OPEB exposure draft; the position of filers was determined
from their comment letters.
Differences in the position taken and differences in
the decision to lobby between these two groups were then
analyzed.

Knowledge about the characteristics of

lobbyists2 in comparison with characteristics of
nonlobbyists is intended to provide the FASB with
information useful for increasing the participation in the
accounting standards setting process.

Corporate

characteristics (such as firm size, leverage position,
accounting method used for OPEB costs, and maturity of
workforce) of firms whose representatives submitted comment
letters to the FASB on OPEB were compared to the same
corporate characteristics of firms whose representatives did
not submit such letters.
The remainder of this chapter describes the accounting
standards setting process, presents an overview of the OPEB
issue, and identifies the contributions of this study.

2 The terms "lobbyists" and "filers" are used
interchangeably throughout this paper.
3
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THE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESS
The Financial Accounting Standards Board is the
standards setting agency for business and nongovernmental
not-for-profit organizations.

Although the FASB is not a

government agency, much of its authority depends on the
support of governmental bodies, such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission.

Private sector support for the FASB's

accounting standards has come from the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). The AICPA's Code of
Professional Ethics Rule 203 prohibits an auditor from
stating that a client's financial statements are prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) when they do not comply with FASB pronouncements in
all material respects,

since the FASB must rely on

voluntary compliance rather than legislated compliance, it
must operate in an environment characterized by an open due
process system.
The FASB established formal communication channels as
part of its due process procedures to allow constituents to
participate in the standards setting process.

Kelly-Newton

(1980) stated that while the due process procedures allow
for considerable input to the policy maker of the reactions
of its constituents, it is important that these opinions are
seen as substantively impacting the final standards in order
to increase public acceptance of the FASB.

4
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The open due process system includes lobbying in the
form of comment letters and documents submitted to the FASB
and oral presentations at public hearings held by the FASB.
Respondents to the FASB's exposure drafts may be classified
as investors and creditors, management, auditors,
regulators, and the academic community (Mezias and Chung,
1989).

This study investigates the participation of

management in response to the OPEB exposure draft because
corporate management is the largest class of financial
statement preparers and users (Ihlanfeldt, 1991).

Corporate

management consistently submits the largest proportion of
the comments the FASB receives on its proposals (Mezias and
Chung, 1989; and Tandy and Wilburn, 1992).
The FASB's due process system begins when an issue is
considered for placement on the Board's agenda.

A task

force is often appointed to work with the Board with the
objective of providing input and direction for a project.
The task force also assists in the preparation of a
discussion memorandum (DM). Discussion memoranda are
distributed to subscribers and made available to others.
Written comments are solicited on each DM, and public
hearings may also be scheduled.

After evaluation of all

written and oral comments, the FASB continues its
deliberations on the subject of the DM.

Issuance of an

exposure draft of a proposed statement of financial
accounting standards follows these deliberations if a
5
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majority of the seven Board members agree on the wording of
the exposure draft.3 Constituents are invited to respond
to the exposure draft with written comments and by
presenting oral comments during public hearings.
In establishing financial accounting standards, two
basic premises of the FASB are that: (1) it should be
responsive to the needs and viewpoints of the entire
economic community, not just the public accounting
profession, and (2) it should operate in full view of the
public through a "due process" system that gives interested
persons an opportunity to make their views known (Johnson
and Solomons, 1984).

Accounting standards are as much a

product of political action as of careful logic or empirical
findings (Horngren, 1973).

Lobbying is an attempt to

influence the standards setting body, in this case, the
FASB.

The decision to lobby is analogous to the decision to

vote.

Two main sources of uncertainty in the voting

decision are the uncertainty about the benefits of voting
and the uncertainty of the effect of a vote on the outcome
of the election (Downs, 1957).

Lobbyists face similar

uncertainties in reaching the decision to lobby (Sutton,
1984).

As of the date of issuance of the OPEB exposure draft,
February, 1989, a simple majority vote (4 of 7) was all that
was required to approve an exposure draft. However, since
that time a super majority (5 of 7) is required to approve any
issuance.
6
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The most effective way to influence the standards that
dictate accounting practice is to participate in the
formulation of these standards, according to Dennis
Beresford (1990), who has been Chairman of the FASB since
1987.

Therefore, the FASB has become the target of many

pressures and efforts to influence change in the development
of new standards.

Considering the expected economic

consequences of some proposed accounting standards, it is
not surprising that interest groups become vocal and
critical when new standards are being formulated.
Due process procedures of the FASB have definite
political process characteristics and have been shown to be
influenced by the lobbying activities of interested
constituents (Hezias and Chung, 1989).

Operation of a

system of due process depends on the manner of involvement
of the participants.

This study provides information about

how the corporate participants and non-participants perceive
the system and their role in it by analyzing corporate
characteristics.

Knowledge about whether corporate

representatives (i.e., managers) choose to participate in
the standards setting process is important to understand the
standards setting mechanism (Gavens, et al., 1989).
Information about participation is useful to the FASB in
assessing the effectiveness of its due process procedures.
Additional knowledge provided by the present study of why
corporate representatives do or do not participate in the
7
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standards setting process allows the FASB greater insight
useful for motivating broader participation and enhancing
communication between the standards setting body and
corporate managers.
Accounting standards affect resource allocation of
corporations; hence, a mechanism is needed to enable
standards setters to form expectations or predictions of the
effect of proposed standards (Kelly, 1982).

Managements'

lobbying activities provide a basis for the FASB to predict
the economic consequences of a proposed accounting standard.
Lobbying efforts from its constituency can assist the FASB
by helping to prevent standards that are unworkable in
application or too costly (Tandy and Wilburn, 1992).
Knowledge about lobbying positions can assist the FASB in
assessing potential opposition to a standard, as well as
assessing subsequent attempts to circumvent reporting
requirements, to subvert the standard, and possibly, to
discredit the policymaker (Kelly, 1985).
Wyatt (1990) stressed that neutrality is a crucial
characteristic of the FASB, in order to maintain the
perception that it is not an agent of any special interest
group.

Lobbying efforts and pressures by certain groups to

have their views adopted is a vital part of the due process.
The Board's modification of its position in reaction to such
efforts does not necessarily support the conclusion that the
Board is primarily political in nature.

For its long run

8
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survival the Board must continually reinforce its
credibility.

A policy of neutrality effectively applied

helps the Board avoid becoming anyone's agent for social
change.

When some parties do not participate, the risk of

the process becoming less neutral and more political
increases by unduly reflecting the views of one or a few
special interests (Wyatt, 1990).
The objective of this study is to provide information
as to why a standard is favored or opposed.

Some lobbyists

describe the actions that they plan to take if the standard
is passed (King and O'Keefe, 1986).

The FASB can judge the

importance of the proposed standard to affected firms by the
number of lobbying comments, the position taken, and the
intensity of the positions taken by the lobbyists.
The FASB conducts its activities under a precept that
calls for "promulgating standards only when the expected
benefits exceed the perceived costs," (FASB, 1992, p.l).
The cost of compliance incurred by preparers should be less
than the benefit to users having information they need to
make prudent decisions.

During the comment period for the

OPEB exposure draft, the Financial Executives Research
Foundation sponsored a field test conducted by Coopers &
Lybrand.

Coopers & Lybrand experimented with the proposed

standards in an attempt to estimate the costs and
feasibility of the exposure draft (FERF, 1989).

Information

about lobbying activities in the OPEB standards setting
9
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process also assists the FASB in evaluating the cost/benefit
issue.
EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS
OTHER THAN PENSIONS
The FASB issued Statement No. 106, "Employers'
Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions,"
in December, 1990, which requires accrual accounting for the
costs of postretirement benefits other than pensions.1 The
Statement was the culmination of discussions that began in
1979 when the FASB added other postretirement benefits to
its project on employers' accounting for pensions.
An exposure draft of a proposed statement was issued in
1979, "Disclosure of Pension and Other Postretirement
Benefit Information" (FASB, 1979).

Disclosure of the

description of other postretirement benefits offered,
accounting method used for these costs, and amount of these
costs for the current period were proposed.

Controversy and

confusion over the exposure draft led the FASB to drop other
postretirement disclosures from the final Statement No. 36
(FASB, 1980) issued in 1980 (Schwartz and Lorentz, 1986).
The FASB issued a discussion memorandum in 1981 which
examined accounting for pensions and other postemployment
1 "This Statement is effective for fiscal years beginning
after December 15, 1992, except that the application of this
Statement to plans outside the United States and certain
small, nonpublic employers is delayed to fiscal years
beginning after December 15, 1994. The amendment of Opinion
12 is effective for fiscal years beginning after March 15,
1991." (FASB, 1990, p. 35.)
10
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benefits (FASB, 1981).

Types of benefits included in "other

postemployment benefits" were identified as healthcare,
tuition assistance, and legal services.

Postemployment is

defined as the period of time after termination (which
includes the period before retirement) during which
disability and other benefits may be provided, whereas
postretirement is defined as the period after retirement.
Postretirement healthcare and life insurance were reported
by the FASB to be more significant than other benefits
(FASB, 1981).
In 1982, the FASB issued a preliminary views document
which proposed that postretirement healthcare and life
insurance benefits be accrued over the period that the
employee rendered service (FASB, 1982).

Further study of

the issue by the FASB and the publication of another
discussion memorandum in 1983 followed (FASB, 1983).
Measurement and transitional problems associated with other
postemployment benefits were addressed by the memorandum.
The FASB separated other postemployment benefits from
pensions in February, 1984.

The other postemployment

benefit issue had been overshadowed by the pension issue.
The FASB believed the separation of these two issues would
allow better identification and consideration of the
problems (Schwartz and Lorentz, 1986).
Statement No. 81 was issued in November, 1984,
requiring disclosure in the notes to the financial
11
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statements of the postretirement healthcare and life
insurance benefits costs, employees covered, accounting
method, and funding policies (FASB, 1984).

In April, 1987,

Technical Bulletin 87-1 was issued to provide guidance to
firms which voluntarily accrued postretirement benefits
(FASB, 1987).
Currently, most firms treat OPEB as a part of their
labor costs, accounting for them on a pay-as-you-go basis
(Gerboth, 1988).

However, the magnitude of OPEB has been

increasing due to an increasing number of retirees, a longer
life expectancy, rising healthcare costs, and a reduction in
Medicare coverage as a proportion of the total cost of
healthcare (Elnathan, 1989).

Estimates by the Employee

Benefit Research Institute project the national OPEB
liability to be about $280 billion (Thomas and Farmer,
1990).

The rapidly increasing size of the OPEB liability

and its potential impact on the reported financial condition
of individual companies led the FASB to issue in February,
1989, an exposure draft of a proposed statement on OPEB
intended to enhance the usefulness and integrity of the
employers' financial statements (FASB, 1989).

The proposed

statement required employers to accrue the expected cost of
postretirement benefits, during the service lives of
employees anticipated to receive postretirement benefits
other than pensions.

12
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After considering written comments on the OPEB exposure
draft and oral comments at public hearings held in New York
City and in Washington, D.C., the FASB issued in December,
1990, its Statement No. 106, "Employers' Accounting for
Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions."

Statement No.

106 reporting requirements are similar to those required for
pensions (FASB, 1985).

Recognition of the actuarial present

value of the OPEB obligation as a liability and the
recognition of the cost of postretirement benefits is
required.

It is generally agreed that costs should be

accrued over the employees' working years since the
postretirement benefits are a form of deferred compensation.
The measurement of these costs presents formidable problems
(Gerboth, 1988).
Initial adoption of statement No. 106 could result in a
large increase in expenses and liabilities of organizations
subject to the Statement.

International Business Machines

Corporation adopted Statement No. 106 in the first quarter
of 1991, resulting in a charge of $2.3 billion (Hooper and
Berton, 1991).

General Electric Company estimated the

impact of the new statement to be a $2.7 billion reduction
in pretax profits; Lockheed disclosed the effect to be
approximately a $1 billion reduction in pretax profits
(Hooper and Berton, 1991).
Potential increases in liabilities and reductions in
net income caused the exposure draft to attract much
13
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attention.

The FASB received 463 comment letters and held

five days of public hearings on the OPEB exposure draft
during the comment period.
The objective of the due process used by the FASB is to
build consensus for financial accounting standards (Kirk,
1981).

Since the FASB functions in a political setting, the

need to build consensus is critical (Hinckley, 1981).

The

FASB's OPEB accounting project was the object of protracted,
and sometimes heated, lobbying efforts in the form of
comment letters, presentations at public hearings,
addresses, news editorials, and many personal contacts
(Beresford, 1990).

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY
This study examined the standards setting process for
postretirement benefits other than pensions.

A review of

the literature revealed that studies of the accounting
standards setting process have been conducted on a limited
number of proposed accounting standards (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1978; Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Francis,
1987; Saemann, 1987; and Chung, 1990).

However, no studies

of both the position and decision to lobby on the OPEB issue
were found.

Since the OPEB accounting standard

significantly changes the prevalent current practice of
accounting for postretirement benefits on the pay-as-you-go
basis, an examination of this issue appeared warranted.
14
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Therefore, a study of the standards setting process for OPEB
was expected to represent a significant contribution to the
existing position choice and lobbying research body of
knowledge.
A limitation of previous research is the omission of a
variable representing the lobbying activities encouraged by
a professional association or an industry association.
Lobbying activities by professional associations are a large
portion of all political activities (Mezias and Chung,
1989). An examination of the comment letters submitted to
the FASB in response to the OPEB proposal revealed that
professional and/or industry associations encouraged
corporate managers to lobby.

It appears that some lobbying

activities which seem to be independent actions of corporate
managers are initiated by professional associations and
industry associations.

This study addressed the issue by

asking corporate managers if they were contacted by a
professional association and/or industry association for the
purpose of encouraging participation in lobbying activities
for OPEB.
As discussed in Chapter 2, most previous research
examined either the decision to lobby or the position taken
on a proposed accounting standard.

Saemann (1987)

investigated both the position and the decision to lobby on
the proposed statement on pensions.

This study extends

Saemann's research by examining the position and the
15
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decision to lobby on the proposed statement on OPEB.
Studying just the position taken on a proposed standard
ignores a major segment of information generated by the
lobbying process.

Improved information is provided when the

position and the decision to participate are both
considered.

A silent majority exists which does not

participate (Beresford, 1990) and this study was undertaken
in an effort to identify the factors that lead to a decision
to participate or not.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Chapter 2, "Review of the Literature," contains an
overview of position choice research and lobbying
participation choice research.
are discussed.

Specific research studies

The rationale for the research hypotheses

and the research methodology are developed and discussed in
Chapter 3, "Research Methodology."

This chapter also

details the sample selection and data collection procedures,
development of the research instrument, and the statistical
techniques used to test each of the research hypotheses.
Chapter 4, "Results of the Study," presents the data and
analyzes the results of empirical tests.

Chapter 5,

"Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations",

includes the

summary, conclusions, limitations of the study, and
suggestions for future research.

16
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief
review of the literature pertinent to the study.

Two areas

of research support this objective: position choice research
and lobbying participation choice5 research.

Position

choice research is concerned with the identification of
economic incentives that are associated with management's
position taken on proposed accounting procedures.

Lobbying

participation choice research is a subset of position choice
research.

Lobbying refers to the actions which interested

parties take to influence a rule-making body.

Since

lobbying may also reveal a preference for an accounting
method, the underlying incentive to lobby should be similar
to that of position choice (Francis, 1987).

To understand

the lobbying participation choice, position choice must also
be examined to determine the economic impact of the proposed
standard on the firm.

The following sections summarize the

relevant literature in position choice research and lobbying
participation choice research.

5 The terms "lobbying" and "lobbying participation
choice" are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
17
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BACKGROUND
A number of researchers have tested models of managers'
position and lobbying participation on various accounting
issues (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Hagerman and Zmijewski,
1979; and Francis, 1987).

These models were based on

economic theories which assume that corporate managers are
self-interested utility maximizers.

A manager's position

and lobbying participation on an accounting proposal are
theorized to be driven by the proposal's influence on the
manager's expected utility.

The corporate manager is

hypothesized to support an accounting proposal if the
expected utility derived from its adoption is greater than
the expected utility from alternatives.

The manager is

hypothesized to lobby on the proposal, regardless of his or
her position, only if the proposal's expected effect on his
or her utility is significant.

POSITION CHOICE RESEARCH
Previous position choice research examined the
relationship between a manager's preferences on proposed
accounting issues and corporate attributes.

Results

consistently identified firm size (measured by assets or
sales) and leverage position to be significant predictors of
management preferences on proposed accounting standards.
Several of these previous studies which are important to the
present research are discussed in the following paragraphs.
18
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The reader should also review the- related research by
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), Dhaliwal (1980), Bowen, et
al., (1981), McKee, et al., (1984), and Espahbodi, et al.,
(1991).
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) developed a model to
investigate the relationship between selected corporate
attributes and corporate managers' preferences regarding
FASB Statement No. 33, "General Price Level Accounting"
(FASB, 1974).

By studying comment letters on the FASB's

discussion memorandum on general price level accounting,
they hypothesized that the position of a manager is related
to firm size (measured by the firm's Fortune 500 rank in
assets and sales6) and the expected effect of the proposed
standard on the firm's earnings.

As firm size increases,

the firm's political visibility increases, as does the
potential effects of a proposed standard on taxes and
regulation (political costs) in relation to the effect on
management compensation (private costs). Therefore, Watts
and Zimmerman hypothesized that the manager of a large firm
is more likely to support standards that decrease earnings
(which results in lower political costs) and the manager of
a small firm is more likely to support standards that
increase earnings (which results in lower private costs).
Their findings supported the hypothesis about firm size,

6 Watts and Zimmerman do not specify if assets and sales
are reported as total or net.
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which has since become known as the size hypothesis, and the
effect of the statement on the firm's earnings.
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) studied a manager's
portfolio of accounting procedure choices.

The study

examined inventory procedures, depreciation procedures,
investment tax credit procedures, and amortization period
for past service pension costs.

Zmijewski and Hagerman

developed 16 portfolios of accounting choices based on
whether the choices were income-increasing or incomedecreasing.

Portfolio ranks (from income-decreasing to

income-increasing) were then predicted using six corporate
attributes: size (measured by the log of net sales),
systematic risk (measured by beta), capital intensity
(measured by gross fixed assets/sales), industry
concentration (defined as the percentage of total industry
sales made up by the top eight firms), presence of a bonus
plan, and total debt/total assets ratio.

Using probit

analysis, a model was developed to predict management's
choice of a portfolio.

Results indicated that the presence

of a bonus plan, the debt/assets ratio, and size are
significant variables in the prediction of manager's
accounting choice.
Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) reviewed research of the
economic consequences of voluntary and mandatory choices of
accounting procedures and standards.

They pointed out that

the economic consequences theories provide predictions about
20
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the characteristics of firms that cause those firms to adopt
specific accounting techniques.

Holthausen and Leftwich

(1983) identified two relationships between choices of
accounting procedures and firm specific factors from
previous research.

These are firm size and leverage which

were used as a proxy for political costs and for contracting
and monitoring costs of debt agreements, respectively.
Saemann (1987) tested a model of position choice for
the pension accounting issue.

Probit analysis was used to

test firm size (measured by total sales and book value of
assets), labor intensity (measured by the number of
employees per sales dollar), leverage (total debt/equity),
and pension plan status (pension obligations/pension assets)
for their significance in the managers' position choice.
Results indicated that firm size and leverage were
significant factors in the position choice.

LOBBYING PARTICIPATION CHOICE RESEARCH
Previous lobbying participation choice research
examined the relationship between lobbying activities and
corporate attributes.

Results consistently identified firm

size (measured by sales and assets) and leverage position to
be significant predictors of management participation in
lobbying activities for proposed accounting standards.
Several of these studies which are important to the present
research are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The
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reader should also review the related research by Bartlett
(1973), Kelly (1982, 1983, and 1985), Morris (1986), and
Gavens, et al., (1989).
Downs (1957) developed an economic model to explain
political decision making behavior.

The assumption of a

self-interested utility maximizing individual is used in
this model.

Downs identified three factors on which an

individual bases a decision to participate in voting
activities.

First, an individual considers the expected

marginal effect of the proposed accounting change on the
expected utility.

Secondly, the individual's perceived

ability to influence the policy outcome affects the expected
benefits to be obtained by lobbying.

Finally, an individual

considers the costs of lobbying when making the decision
whether or not to lobby.
Sutton (1984) applied Downs' voting model to the
lobbying setting.

According to Sutton, lobbying generates

low returns because of the free-rider problem and the low
probability of influencing the decision.

Sutton concluded:

(1) producers of financial statements are more likely to
lobby than consumers of financial statements; and (2) large
producers are more likely to lobby than small producers, due
to the cost of lobbying.
Dhaliwal (1982) examined the positions of comment
letters submitted in response to the FASB discussion
memorandum on accounting for interest costs (FASB, 1975).
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Dhaliwal hypothesized that firms with higher leverage ratios
oppose accounting standards which decrease reported earnings
or equity, or increase the volatility of reported earnings.
Also tested were the size (in terms of assets) and bonus
plan variables.

The results of univariate tests, the Mann-

Whitney U test and the chi-square goodness of fit test, did
not find the size or bonus plan variables significant in
predicting lobbying behavior.

However, the results did

support the significance of the leverage variable.

Dhaliwal

then performed discriminant analysis to determine the
discriminatory power of the independent variables.

The

model was able to distinguish between the firms that opposed
interest capitalization and those that opposed the expensing
of interest by classifying 81.82 percent correctly.
Francis (1987) investigated lobbying activities on the
FASB's Preliminary Views on "Employers' Accounting for
Pensions and Other Postemployment Benefits."

The author

presented two hypotheses: (1) lobbying firms are expected to
be larger (firm size measured by net sales); and (2)
lobbying firms are expected to have a relatively larger pro
forma negative impact on financial statements (larger
pension liability and larger pension expense). Francis
examined the variables size (net sales), leverage (net
pension liability/assets), and a ratio of pension expense to
pretax earnings.

Univariate and multivariate tests were

conducted using the Mann-Whitney U and logit procedures.
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Univariate test results indicated that size (net sales),
leverage, and the pension expense ratio were significantly
different between lobbying and nonlobbying firms.

A matched

pairs design was also performed on 75 lobbying and 75
nonlobbying firms matched by size (net sales) and SIC code,
with similar results.

Francis concluded that both firm

size, measured by net sales, leverage, and negative
financial statement effects influence the decision to lobby.
Saemann (1987) developed and tested a model of lobbying
participation choice for the pension accounting issue.

A

randomly selected sample of firms, including comment letter
filers and nonfilers, was obtained and tested for
significant factors between the groups.

Probit analysis was

used to test the following factors influencing lobbying
participation choice; firm size (measured by total sales and
book value of assets), labor intensity (measured by the
number of employees per sales dollar), leverage (total
debt/equity), pension plan status (pension
obligations/pension assets), managers' cost expectations of
the proposed standard, and managers' perceptions of the
FASB.

Results indicated that firm size, managers' cost

expectations of the proposed standard, and managers'
perceptions of the FASB were significant factors in lobbying
participation choice.
Deakin (1989) investigated lobbying activity by the oil
and gas industry over the discussion memorandum (FASB,
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1975), exposure draft (FASB, 1977), and SEC appeal of the
full cost accounting method (SEC, 1978).

The oil and gas

accounting debate began when the FASB was delegated to
develop a uniform accounting method for the industry by the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.

The related

discussion memorandum and exposure draft, issued by the
FASB, proposed the elimination of the full cost accounting
method that had been used by many oil and gas firms.

The

FASB's decision was appealed to the SEC after the final
statement was issued.

Therefore, there were three different

events where lobbying activity was undertaken.

Deakin

tested debt covenant costs, existence of bonus plans, the
size of the operations subject to the accounting change
(measured by expenditures on oil and gas activities), and
regulation in a logit regression model.

The models, one for

each lobbying event, were significant in the prediction of a
firm's decision to lobby.

The logit classification models

were consistently better than chance in predicting lobbying
on these events.

The model correctly classified 79.8

percent of the firms for the discussion memorandum, 82.2
percent of the firms for the exposure draft, and 76.3
percent of the firms for the SEC appeal.
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SUMMARY
In summary, previous research investigated the
relationship between various corporate attributes and
managements' position and decision to lobby on a proposed
standard.

Results consistently identified firm size (as

defined by assets and sales), impact of the proposed
standard on the financial statements, and leverage position
as significant factors in managements' position on a
proposed standard.

Research on the decision to lobby found

firm size (measured by assets and sales), the impact of the
proposed standard on the financial statements, and the
leverage position to be significant factors.

The important

variables of selected empirical research studies are
summarized in Table 2-1.

Drawing from previous research

this study develops and tests the hypotheses described in
Chapter 3.
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TABLE 2-1
Summary of Selected Empirical Research Results
Position Choice
Study

Important Variables

Watts and Zimmerman
(1978)

Firm Size (assets and sales7)
Expected Effect of Proposed
Standard on Firm's Earnings

Zmijewski and Hagerman
(1981)

Firm Size (log of net sales)
Existence of Bonus Plan
Leverage (debt/assets)

Saemann
(1987)

Firm Size (total sales and book
value of assets)
Leverage (debt/equity)
Lobbying Participation Choice

Dhaliwal
(1982)

Leverage (debt/equity)

Francis
(1987)

Firm Size (net sales)
Leverage (net pension
liability/assets)
Financial Statement Effects
(pension expense/pretax
earnings)

Saemann
(1987)

Firm Size (total sales and book
value of assets)
Managers' Cost Expectations
Managers' Perceptions of FASB

Deakin
(1989)

Debt Covenant Costs
Existence of Bonus Plans
Size of Operations (expenditures
on oil and gas activities)
Regulation

7 Assets and sales are not identified as total or net.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, a corporate representative's
position choice and lobbying participation choice models on
the OPEB accounting issue are derived from positive
o

accounting theory and Downs' model of political behavior.
Initial recognition of the reported OPEB expense, OPEB
liability, and footnote disclosures are required by
Statement No. 106, issued in December, 1990, effective for
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1992, except that
the application of this Statement to plans outside the
United States and certain small, nonpublic employers is
delayed to fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1994
(SFAS No. 106, p. 35).

These changes are expected to result

in real cash outflows (costs) as a result of changes in
contractual arrangements such as debt covenants, management
compensation arrangements, and union contracts.

The

position taken by a corporate representative is hypothesized
to be related to expected changes in corporate political
costs, leverage position, impact on the financial
statements, and accounting method used for OPEB costs before
the effective date of the proposed standard (Watts and
8 Positive accounting theory refers to accounting
theory that attempts to explain and predict phenomena (Watts
and Zimmerman, 1986).
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Zimmerman, 1978; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Holthausen
and Leftwich, 1983; and Saemann, 1987).

The manager's

lobbying participation choice is hypothesized to be related
to encouragement by a professional association and/or
industry association to participate in the standards setting
process, impact on the financial statements, leverage
position, and firm size (Dhaliwal, 1982; Kelly, 1982 and
1985; Francis, 1987; and Saemann, 1987).
This chapter formalizes the anticipated statistical
relationships between corporate characteristics and
encouragement by professional organizations and/or industry
associations with corporate manager position choice and
lobbying participation choice in the standards setting
process of the OPEB exposure draft.

Two sets of hypotheses

are described, one set for position choice and one set for
lobbying participation choice.

The population, target

population, and sample are identified, the research
instrument is developed, and a description of the
statistical methodology is presented.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE POSITION CHOICE HYPOTHESES
Initial adoption of the standard and accrual of the
OPEB obligation was expected to result in an increase in
liabilities and expenses for firms that used the pay-as-yougo method of accounting for postretirement benefits other
than pension.

Management chooses a position based on the
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perceived effects of the proposed standard on the firm.

The

first set of hypotheses concerns the relationship between
the position taken by a management representative on the
OPEB exposure draft and the expected costs to the
corporation employing the representative.

The variables

used to express these hypotheses are (1) firm size (measured
by number of fulltime, nonseasonal employees), (2) maturity
of the workforce (measured by the ratio of employees to
retirees), (3) the debt to equity ratio (measured by the
book value of debt before recognition of the OPEB liability
divided by the book value of equity), and (4) the accounting
method used for OPEB costs before the effective date of the
proposed standard.
Prior research identified political costs, as measured
by firm size (variously defined as total assets, net sales,
or number of employees), as a significant variable in the
position choice of a manager on proposed accounting
standards (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Hagerman and
Zmijewski, 1979; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Holthausen
and Leftwich, 1983; and Saemann, 1987).

As companies become

larger they are more visible and therefore more subject to
adverse wealth effects arising from political activities,
such as taxation and antitrust regulation, and are more
likely to favor proposed accounting standards that reduce
income (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).

Initial accrual of OPEB

requires recognition of past service costs that would
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decrease reported income significantly for organizations
with a mature workforce9 (FERF, 1989).

Number of employees

is a relevant measure of firm size since OPEB concerns
employee benefits, and the FASB, in the OPEB exposure draft,
has defined the size of a company by the number of
employees.

Management representatives of large companies,

which are more politically visible than small companies, are
expected to have favored the OPEB exposure draft.

Hence,

the first research hypothesis is:
H,:

The larger the number of employees, the
more likely it is that the company
representative reports having favored the
OPEB exposure draft.

The impact of the exposure draft on a specific company
depends on several factors, including the nature of the
benefits provided, the demographic characteristics of the
workforce, and the actuarial assumptions used to measure the
expense and the obligation.

According to the field test of

the implementation of the standards proposed in the exposure
draft of OPEB (FERF, 1989), the most important determinant
of the impact of OPEB on a company is the maturity of the

The maturity of a company's workforce is defined in the
Financial Executives Research Foundation's (FERF, 1989) study
as the ratio of the number of active (as opposed to retired)
employees to the number of retirees.
The current study
obtained the number of employees from the Compustat Tapes and
the Moody's Corporate Manuals which report fulltime,
nonseasonal employees. Therefore, although the FERF study
uses the term active employees, the current study prefers the
term fulltime employees.
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workforce (i.e., the more retirees relative to the number of
employees a company has, the greater impact there is on the
reported liability, due to the large past service costs to
be recognized). Based on the results of the field test, it
is hypothesized that there is an inverse relationship
between the maturity of a company's workforce and the
management's position on the exposure draft:
H2:

The greater the maturity of a company's
workforce, the less likely it is that the
company representative reports having favored
the OPEB exposure draft.

Previous research suggested that managers of firms
which are highly leveraged (i.e., have a larger debt to
equity ratio) oppose accounting changes which decrease
reported earnings or increase the variability of reported
earnings more often than firms which are not as highly
leveraged (Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Bowen, et al.,
1981; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; and Saemann, 1987).
The capital structure of a company impacts on the choice of
accounting methods because of restrictive covenants
contained in credit agreements.

Accounting numbers are

frequently used in debt contracts to stipulate restrictions
on dividends, future debt, and working capital.

An

accounting change that lowers income decreases the book
value of equity, increases the debt to equity ratio, and
reduces retained earnings available for dividends.

Tighter

restrictions increase expected costs associated with
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technical default and renegotiation (Kelly, 1982).

Thus, it

is hypothesized that highly leveraged companies are not as
likely to favor OPEB because of the large liability to be
recognized when the standard is initially adopted.

Total

book value of debt before recognition of the OPEB liability
divided by total book value of equity is used to measure the
leverage ratio.

This leads to the following research

hypothesis:
H3:

The greater the debt to equity ratio before
recognition of the OPEB liability, the less
likely it is that the company representative
reports having favored the OPEB exposure
draft.

Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1979) stated that corporate
managers select accounting methods that either reduce the
cost or increase the benefits of regulations that affect the
wealth of the firm because their self-interest is linked to
this wealth.

If a firm accrued OPEB costs before the

proposed standard became effective, the manager was
considered to be maximizing the utility with the accounting
procedures used at that time.

Thus, it is hypothesized that

if a company accrued OPEB costs before the proposed standard
became effective, the manager favored the OPEB exposure
draft:
H4:

If the company accrued OPEB costs before
the proposed standard became effective, the
more likely it is that the company
representative reports having favored the
OPEB exposure draft.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOBBYING PARTICIPATION CHOICE HYPOTHESES
The second set of hypotheses concerns the decision, by
management, of whether or not to participate in the
accounting standards setting process.

The variables used to

express these hypotheses are (1) encouragement by a
professional association and/or industry association to
participate in the standards setting process, (2) firm size
(measured by the number of employees), (3) maturity of the
workforce (measured by the ratio of employees to retirees),
and (4) the debt to equity ratio (measured by book value of
debt before recognition of the OPEB liability divided by
book value of equity).
Professional associations and industry associations
appeal to their membership for assistance in lobbying for or
against a proposed accounting standard.

The Financial

Executives Institute (FEI) requests its members to express
their views on financial accounting and reporting issues by
submitting their comment letters to the FASB (FEI, 1991).
The rational behavior of managers brings them to join a
group which acts collectively to provide benefits to the
members (Olson, 1968).

Therefore, contact by a professional

and/or industry association to request the firm's
participation in the lobbying activities for or against the
proposed exposure draft on OPEB is hypothesized to be a
significant variable in the decision to participate in
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lobbying activities.

This leads to the following research

hypothesis:
H5:

If the company was encouraged by a
professional or industry association to
participate in lobbying activities for the
OPEB exposure draft, the more likely it is
that the company representative participated
in lobbying activities for the OPEB exposure
draft.

Previous research also found that larger firms are more
likely to participate in lobbying activities than smaller
firms, due to the cost of lobbying (Olson, 1968; Sutton,
1984; Morris, 1986; Francis, 1987; Saemann, 1987; Gavens, et
al., 1989; and Deakin, 1989).

Thus, it is hypothesized that

larger firms are more likely to participate in lobbying
activities on the OPEB exposure draft than smaller firms.
Firm size is measured in terms of the number of employees.
Hence, the research hypothesis is:
H6:

The larger the number of employees, the more
likely it is that the company representative
participated in lobbying activities for the
OPEB exposure draft.

The more mature the workforce of a company, the greater
the impact of the proposed OPEB standard on the financial
statements of a company (FERF, 1989)10. The greater the
impact of the proposed standard, the greater the costs that

The specific impact on the financial statements in the
year of adoption is heavily dependent on the transition
approach (FERF, 1989).
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are incurred.

As these costs increase, management's

incentive to lobby against the proposed standard increases
(Francis, 1987).

This leads to the following hypothesis:

H7: The greater the maturity of a company's
workforce, the more likely it is that the
company representative participated in
lobbying activities for the OPEB exposure
draft.
Previous research suggested that managers of companies
with a larger debt to equity ratio (i.e., more highly
leveraged) are more likely to participate in lobbying
activities than companies with a smaller debt to equity
ratio.

Firms which are closer to the limits set by their

debt covenants are hypothesized to be more concerned with
the OPEB standard (because of the large liability to be
recognized) than those firms which are not approaching
limits set by debt covenants, and are, therefore, more
likely to participate in lobbying activities.

This leads to

the following research hypothesis:
Ha:

The greater the debt to equity ratio before
recognition of the OPEB liability, the more
likely it is that the company representative
participated in lobbying activities for the
OPEB exposure draft.

POPULATION, TARGET POPULATION, AND SAMPLE OF FIRMS
Statement No. 106 is applicable to all employers that
provide postretirement benefits other than pensions to their
employees.

The Statement is effective for fiscal years
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beginning after December 15, 1992, however, a delayed
effective date (fiscal years beginning after December 15,
1994) is provided for plans outside the U.S. and employers
that are nonpublic enterprises with no more than 500 plan
participants.

Ideally, a study of manager behavior in the

accounting standards setting process for OPEB should include
a random sample of all companies that provide postretirement
benefits other than pensions.

Because of the delayed

effective date for small, nonpublic companies, and plans
outside the U.S., the decision to lobby may not have been
the same for these companies as it was for public companies
and larger, nonpublic companies.

Therefore, this study

defines the target population to be comprised of companies
that are subject to the December 15, 1992, effective date.
Identification of firms that provide postretirement
benefits other than pensions was accomplished by searching
the National Automated Accounting Research System (NAARS)
database and the Disclosure Incorporated database.

The

present study identified 632 companies which provide
postretirement benefits other than pensions.

An unknown

number of additional firms may exist that are not reported
by these databases.
There were 463 letters filed with the FASB commenting
on the OPEB exposure draft.

These comment letters have been

categorized by type of respondent (Table 3-1).

Corporate

representatives were found to be the largest group of
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TABLE 3-1
Categorization of Respondents to the Exposure Draft
Investors and Creditors........... 44
Corporate Representatives........ 287
Insurance Companies.............. 18
Auditors........................ 12
Regulators and Government......... 19
Academic Community................ 6
Professional Associations......... 47
Other........................... 30
Total

463

Industry Distribution of Corporate Representatives
Utility Companies.................86
Industrial Companies.............201
Total

287
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respondents to the exposure draft, as was found in previous
research (Mezias and Chung, 1989; and Tandy and Wilburn,
1992). The 287 firms in the target population whose
representatives filed comment letters to the FASB on the
OPEB exposure draft are listed in Appendix A.11 The
industry distribution of these firms is 201 (70.03%)
industrial companies and 86 (29.97%) utility companies.
After removing those firms which responded to the OPEB
exposure draft from the 632 firms identified in the
databases, a working population of nonfilers was then
selected from the remaining firms so as to match the
industry distribution of the group of filers.

This working

population of nonfilers which is listed in Appendix B
includes 337 firms— 244 (72.40%) industrial companies and
93 (27.60%) utility companies.

A test to determine if the

industry distribution of the survey respondents reflects
that of the population under study is necessary.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT
Questionnaires are used to provide information which
cannot be obtained from any other source available to the
researcher.

One questionnaire (see Appendix C) was sent to

the person who signed the comment letter that presented each
firm's position on OPEB; a second questionnaire (see

11 Due to a limited number of insurance companies, as
identified in Table 3-1, they were eliminated from this study.
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Appendix D) was sent to the vice President of Finance, by
name (identified by Moody's Corporate Manuals), of each firm
in the nonfiler list.

The questionnaires sent to those who

responded to the FASB on the OPEB exposure draft requested
information about the ratio of employees to retirees and
whether or not professional associations and/or industry
associations encouraged participation in the standards
setting process for the exposure draft.

The questionnaires

sent to the firms that did not respond to the FASB on the
OPEB exposure draft requested information about the
management's position on OPEB, the ratio of employees to
retirees, and whether or not professional and/or industry
associations encouraged their firm's participation in the
standards setting process for the exposure draft.

Survey
To increase the response rate, a cover letter which
explains the purpose and importance of the study accompanied
each questionnaire.

The cover letters assured the

respondents that their names and the names of their
companies would be kept strictly confidential (see
Appendices C & D). A second request was sent to those
company representatives that had not responded within four
weeks after the original survey was mailed.

The second

mailing also included a copy of the questionnaire.
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The response rate is most likely a function of each
questionnaire recipient's perceived importance of the
project, and the length and overall appearance of the survey
instrument (Babbie, 1990).

The questionnaire for this study

could be completed in less than ten minutes, as was
demonstrated by a group of accounting graduate students at
the University of Arkansas.

However, the use of a

questionnaire may introduce limitations resulting from
possible nonresponse bias.

Thus, comparisons were made

between early respondents and late respondents (who are
assumed to be representative of nonrespondents) to determine
if there was a nonresponse bias (Oppenheim, 1966; Buzby,
1974; and Armstrong and Overton, 1977).

STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY
Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used
to describe and evaluate the factors selected for this
study.

Dependent variables, independent variables, and

statistical tests are discussed in following sections.

Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in this study are the corporate
manager's position choice and lobbying participation choice
on the OPEB exposure draft.
binary.

Both dependent variables are

A manager's position choice is evaluated as either

favoring or not favoring the OPEB exposure draft (1 denotes
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favoring, 0 denotes not favoring). The evaluation of
favoring or not favoring the OPEB exposure draft is based on
the manager's agreement with the concept of accruing these
costs, regardless of the manager's position on
implementation issues.

A manager's lobbying participation

choice is identified as having participated in the standards
setting process (1-denotes lobbying, 0 denotes no lobbying).
Table 3-2 summarizes the coding and data sources for the
dependent variables and independent variables discussed
below.

Independent Variables

The independent variables for this study are specified
as (1) firm size, (2) maturity of workforce, (3) leverage,
(4) encouragement by a professional association and/or
industry association, and (5) voluntary accrual of OPEB
costs before the proposed standard became effective.
Firm size is measured using the corporate attribute of
number of employees12. The number of employees was
obtained from the Standard & Poor's Compustat Tapes and from
the Moody's Corporate Manuals for companies not reported by
the Compustat Tapes.
Maturity of the workforce is defined as the ratio of
the number of employees to the number of retirees.

The

12 The number of employees used in this study is defined
as the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers.
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TABLE 3-2
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Variable

Variable
Abbreviation

Coding

Data
Source

Dependent:
Position Choice

PC

1 = favor
0 = not favor

Survey or
FASB

Lobbying
Participation Choice

LPC

1 = lobbied
0 « did not lobby

FASB

Firm Size
(Number of
Employees)

EMP

actual number

Compustat
or Moody's

Impact on
Financial Statements
(Maturity of
Workforce)

MATURITY

# of employees
t of retireeB

Survey and
Compustat
or Moody's

Leverage Position
(Debt/Equity)

DEBT

Total BV Debt
Total BV Equity

NAARS,
Compustat
or Moody's

Accrual of OPEB

ACCRUE

1 = yes
0 = no

NAARS

Professional and/or
In
dustry Association
Encouragement

ENCOURAGEMENT

1 = yes
0 = no

Survey

Independent:
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number of retirees was requested in the survey and the
number of employees was obtained from the Compustat Tapes or
Moody's Corporate Manuals.
A firm's leverage position is measured by the ratio of
total book value of debt to total book value of equity.
Total book value of debt and total book value of equity were
obtained from the Compustat Tapes, NAARS, or Moody's
Corporate Manuals.
The accounting method used for OPEB costs before the
effective date of the proposed OPEB standard is measured as
a dichotomous variable.

A firm that accrued OPEB costs is

coded "1" and a firm that used the alternative pay-as-you-go
method for accounting for OPEB costs is coded "0".

The

accounting method used for OPEB costs was obtained from the
NAARS database.
If the company representative was encouraged by a
professional and/or industry association to participate in
the standards setting process for the proposed OPEB
accounting standard, this variable is coded "1 "; if not,
"0".

Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Statistical Tests

Selected descriptive statistics were calculated for
each independent variable by industry.

Univariate analysis

of the independent variables was performed separately by
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industry for (1 ) filers and nonfilers and (2 ) respondents
favoring and not favoring the OPEB exposure draft.
Logistic Regression Analysis
Statistical models were developed to test the research
hypotheses relating to position choice and to lobbying
participation choice.

The logistic regression procedures

were performed separately for industrial companies and for
utility companies.

These symbolic models are13:

Model 1:
Position Choice
PC = f(EMP, MATURITY, DEBT)
Model 2:
Lobbying Participation Choice
LPC = f(EMP, MATURITY, DEBT)
Each model involves a dichotomous dependent variable,
in general denoted as Y, which is associated with a
parameter, P, that represents the probability of observing a
response of Y equal to 1.

The probability of this response,

P (Yj = 1 ), depends on the values of the independent
variables, so the linear probability model is expressed as:
K
P, - P (Y. - 1) - B0 + ZB-Xj.
J-1

where

i

= index to denote the ith observation,
l ~ 1 ,...,n,

n

= number of observations,

As reported in Chapter 4, research hypotheses four and
five cannot be tested; not enough companies indicated "yes for
ACCRUE" or "yes for ENCOURAGEMENT" to test statistically the
related research hypotheses.
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j

= index to denote the jth independent
variable, j =

Bj

= the regression coefficients (including
the intercept), and

Xjj

= the ith observation of the jth
independent variable.

A difficulty with the linear probability model is that
while P( is constrained to be from zero to one, B0 + £BjX,j is
not.

Restricting B0 + EBjX,j to the interval from zero to

one (since it is interpreted as a probability) imposes
strict constraints upon the linear model.

Furthermore, the

change in the probability of Y being a linear function of
the independent variables is "highly suspect" (Aldrich and
Nelson, 1986).
For these reasons and because of assumptions associated
with ordinary least squares regression, a nonlinear logistic
regression model is preferred in this study.

Logistic

regression, rather than ordinary least squares, is the
preferable method for modeling dichotomous accounting
choices (Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Amemiya, 1981; and
Stone and Rasp, 1991).

Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) state

that ordinary least squares (OLS) regression parameter
estimates are inefficient for models with dichotomous
response variables.

Amemiya (1981) concluded that logit is

preferable to OLS when the response variable is dichotomous
and the sample size is large.

Stone and Rasp (1991) found

that even with small samples, logit is the preferable method
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for modeling dichotomous accounting choices because OLS can
result in higher misclassification rates, a number of
meaningless probability estimates, and less powerful tests
of parameter estimates.
The logistic regression model uses a maximum likelihood
estimation technique and requires fewer and less rigid
assumptions.

When the dependent variable is binary, it is

not normally distributed and logistic maximum likelihood
estimators provide consistently more robust estimators
(Press and Wilson, 1978; and Neter, et al., 1990).

Assumptions of the Logistic Regression Model
The logistic regression model is based on the following
five assumptions (Aldrich and Nelson, 1986):
(1)

The dependent variable, Y, is binary.

(2)

Y is assumed to be dependent upon K observable
variables Xjf j = 1,...,K.

The probability that

Y=1 is denoted by the parameter, P, and is
expressed:
P = P(Y = 1 | X1f...,XK)
(3)

The relationship between Y and X = (X1,...,XK) is
assumed to be nonlinear.

This relationship is

expressed by the logistic function or logit
model:
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K

K

P(Y - 1 I X) - exp(B0 + Xb.v ) / [3. + exp(B0 + ZB,Xfj)]
j-1

where

Bj

=

X,j =
(4)

j-1

regression coefficients (including
the constant term), and
observable independent variables.

All observations of Y are assumed to be
statistically independent of each other,
eliminating serial correlation.

(5)

No exact or near linear dependencies are assumed
to exist among the set of independent variables.

The problem of multicollinearity is examined in Chap
ter 4.

Multicollinearity among the independent variables

reduces the ability of the multivariate analysis to identify
significant variables (Davis and Cosenza, 1988).
Multicollinearity which is serious enough to cause incorrect
signs for regression coefficients or other symptoms of
nonsensical regression was defined as "harmful
multicollinearity" (Farrar and Glauber, 1967).

Farrar and

Glauber stated that there may be "acceptable" departures
from orthogonality that can be distinguished from "harmful"
degrees of multicollinearity.

A rule of thumb for

constraining bivariate correlations between explanatory
variables to prevent harmful interdependence was to avoid
bivariate correlation coefficients of greater than .8
(Farrar and Glauber, 1967).

In addition, the variance
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inflation factors are examined for indications of
multicollinearity.

Interpretation of Logistic Regression Results

The objective of logit analysis is to measure
statistically the relationship between the independent
variables and the dependent variable.

Likelihood equations

in logistic regression are nonlinear in the parameters that
are estimated.

Hence, the maximum likelihood estimates of

the coefficients are approximations produced through
standard iterative algorithms (Aldrich and Nelson, 1986).
Tests of the performance of the model are calculated
after convergence of the model is obtained.

To test the

overall significance of the model, a model likelihood ratio
chi-square is calculated.

The likelihood ratio statistic is

computed as follows (Aldrich and Nelson, 1986):
c = -2 In (L0/L1)
where

LI = the value of the likelihood function for the
full model, and
LO = the maximum value of the likelihood
function if all coefficients except the
intercept are zero.

The number of independent variables included in the logistic
regression model is the degrees of freedom for this chisquare statistic.
The dependent variable in logit analysis does not have
separate mean and variance parameters, as in regression
analysis, because these parameters are both functions of the
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probability P(. Therefore, there is no statistic in logit
analysis with an interpretation similar to the coefficient
of determination in regression analysis.

Minimizing

variance is not a sensible criterion with which to measure
the model's adequacy (Aldrich and Nelson, 1986).

Therefore,

Aldrich and Nelson (1986) proposed a pseudo R2 measure
defined as:
pseudo R2 = c/(n + c)
where

c = the chi-square statistic defined above, and
n = the sample size.

The pseudo R2 measure ranges between zero and one.

As

pseudo R2 approaches zero the quality of the model's fit
decreases, and as it approaches one the quality of the
model's fit increases.

However, the pseudo R2 measure does

not adjust for an increasing number of independent
variables.

A correction for the degrees of freedom could be

made, although there is little justification (Aldrich and
Nelson, 1986).

Although not universally accepted, the use

of the pseudo R2 as an indicator of the explanatory power of
the model is used in the study, as has been done in previous
lobbying participation choice research (Kelly, 1985;
Francis, 1987; and Deakin, 1989).
The hypotheses were tested by interpreting the
significance of the individual independent variables'
logistic regression coefficients as determined from the tstatistic with degrees of freedom equal to the sample size
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minus the number of model parameters.

Aldrich and Nelson

(1986) define the t-statistic as:
W

where

SJ

tj

= the t-statistic for the jth parameter
estimate,

bj

= the jth parameter estimate, and

Sj

= the standard error of the jth parameter
estimate.

SUMMARY

Previous research has supported the theory that there
is a relationship between the economic consequences of an
accounting proposal and the position and lobbying
participation choices of a corporate manager.

The current

research examined the standards setting process for FASB
Statement No. 106.

A variable now thought to impact these

choices, but omitted from previous research, is included in
this study.

Previous research is extended by including a

variable representing the maturity of the workforce.

The

current study also extends previous research by studying a
large group of nonfilers as well as filers.

The results

from this research provide additional evidence about
corporate managers' behavior in the accounting standards
setting process.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS OP THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the results of the data collection
procedures, descriptive statistics, univariate analysis, and
tests of the research hypotheses are presented and
discussed.

The statistical analyses used procedures

developed by SPSS Incorporated (1990).

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY
A summary of the number of responses, percent response
rates, and usable response rates by filers and nonfilers is
presented in Table 4-1.

Of the 195 usable responses, 124

had responded to the FASB's OPEB exposure draft (filers) and
71 had not responded to the FASB's OPEB exposure draft
(nonfilers).

A 43.21 percent usable response rate (124/287)

was achieved for filers and a 21.07 percent usable response
rate (71/337) was achieved for nonfilers.

The percentages

of industry respondents also are reported in Table 4-1.
Tests for Survey Nonresponse Bias
Since the response rate is less than 100 percent, the
sample may be subject to nonresponse bias.

Therefore,

analyses were performed to determine the extent, if any, of
that bias.
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TABLE 4-1
NUMBER OF SURVEYS RETURNED

Population

Filers
287 (100 .00%)

Industrial
Utilities
Surveys Returned

153

Industrial
Utilities

244 (72.40%)
93 (27.60%)

(53.31%)

96

29

(10 .10%)

25

(43.21%)
71 (57.26%)
53 (42.74%)

(7.42%)
19 (76.00%)
6 (24.00%)

19 (65.52%)
10 (34.48%)
124

(28.49%)
69 (71.87%)
27 (28.13%)

90 (58.82%)
63 (41.18%)

Industrial
Utilities
Total Usable
Responses

337 (100 .00%)

201 (70.03%)
86 (29.97%)

Industrial
Utilities
Unusable Responses

Nonfilers

71

(21.07%)
50 (70.42%)
21 (29.58%)
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First, to determine if the industry distribution of
survey respondents reflects that of the population under
study, chi-square goodness of fit tests were performed.

The

results of these tests, reported in Table 4-2, suggest that
the sample of filers does not appear to be representative of
the target population (p-value=.002 )— survey respondents
included proportionally more utility companies.

Thus,

separate logistic regression models for industrial and
utility companies were analyzed.
Additionally, possible nonresponse bias was
investigated by examining differences between early and late
respondents.

These comparisons are based on the assertion

that late respondents may be similar to nonrespondents.
Table 4-3 presents the frequency distribution of the number
of surveys received each week.

Responses during the first

three week period (161 responses) are considered early
respondents; those received thereafter (34 responses) are
considered late respondents.
The "early-late" hypotheses tested are that there is no
difference between the means of selected variables for early
and late respondents.14 The variables representing firm
size (EMP) and leverage position (DEBT) were chosen because
previous research has consistently identified these
variables, and these were the only variables for which the

14

There was an insufficient number of responses in the
late period (weeks 4-6) to analyze by industry.
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TABLE 4-2

GOODNESS OF FIT TEST
FOR INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION
BY FILERS AND NONFILERS
Companies

Filers”
Population

Industrial
Utilities
Total

Nonfilersb

Respondents

Population

Respondents

201

71

244

50

86

53

93

21

287

124

337

71

8 chi-square statistic for Filers = 9.646 (p-value =.002)

b chi-square statistic for Nonfilers = .139 (p-value =.709)
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TABLE 4-3

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SURVEYS
RECEIVED EACH WEEK

Week of
Collection
Period

Number of Responses Received
Filers

Nonfilers

1

51

43

2

17

0

3

37

13

4

10

6

5

7

8

6

2

1

124

71

Total
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data were available independent of the survey.

An

examination of Table 4-4 reveals that there are no
significant differences.

Therefore, nonresponse bias does

not appear to be a problem.
other Survey Results

Information obtained by the survey includes data to
test the research hypotheses as well as other information
such as: reasons for not participating in lobbying
activities for OPEB, the professional and/or industry
associations which encouraged companies to respond to the
FASB on the OPEB issue, and lobbying activities on other
FASB issues.

Forty-five percent (32/71) of nonfilers stated

that they did not believe commenting would affect FASB's
final statement.
comment.

One respondent stated: "It is futile to

The FASB is a self contained xenophobic

bureaucracy issuing pronouncements without ever giving due
consideration to its constituency."

The FASB should be

aware that the belief that commenting would have no affect
on FASB's final statement was found to be the number one
reason for not participating in lobbying activities for or
against the OPEB exposure draft.

Fourteen percent (10/71)

of nonfilers answered that they agreed with the OPEB
exposure draft and therefore did not respond— which
provides some support for Beresford's (1990) contention that
there is a silent majority which agrees with the FASB and
therefore does not respond.
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TABLE 4-4
TESTS FOR NONRESPONSE BIAS

FILERS
Variable*

Mean
Early
n*105

EMP

DEBT

NONFILERS .
tb

p-value'

Late
n*19

Mean
Early
n=56

Late
n=15

tb

p-value'

32478.11

48646.58

.78

.44

7516.37

24155.07

1.25

.23

2.80

2.02

-1.41

.16

1.93

3.51

1.39

.18

* The variables denote the following:
EMP: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers.
DEBT: the total debt to total equity ratio.
b Pooled or separate variance test used depending on
equality of variances.
c 2-tailed p-values.
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Other respondents reported that they relied on the
professional and/or industry associations to represent them
in their lobbying efforts.

Ninety-eight respondents

identified the industry and/or professional association
which encouraged their firms to respond to the FASB on the
OPEB issue.

Forty-three percent (42/98) identified the

Financial Executives Institute (FEI), 24 percent (23/98)
identified the Edison Electric Institute, 17 percent (17/98)
identified the American Gas Association, and 5 percent
(5/98) identified the American Mining Congress.
When asked about participation in lobbying activities
regarding the FASB's exposure drafts, 63 percent (123/195)
of respondents answered that they respond to the FASB's
exposure draft only if the proposed standard is expected to
have an effect (adverse or otherwise) on their company's
financial statements.

Twenty-one percent (41/195) stated

that they never respond and 10 percent (19/195) replied that
they always respond to the FASB's exposure drafts.

The

responses described above reveal that respondents to the
FASB's exposure draft on OPEB were not representative of
their constituency, but instead a select group.

The FASB

should be aware of the motivations of the firms
participating in lobbying activities.
summary Statistics

Table 4-5 presents summary statistics for the
independent variables by industry.

An analysis of these
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TABLE 4-5
SUMMARY STATISTICS*
Variable15
Quantitative
EMP
Industrial
Utilities

Mean

Standard Minimum Maximum Median
Deviation

35161.26
11665.09

84382.64
29420.87

524
504

775099
201399

14000
4619

DEBT
Industrial
Utilities

2.54
2.50

4.69
2.92

.19
.15

43.49
20.72

1.47
1.75

MATURITY
Industrial
Utilities

28.09
29.12

126.44
179.98

.26
.33

1332
1550

5.50
3.45

Qualitative

"YES"

"NO"

ACCRUE
Industrial
Utilities

6
2

115
72

54
47

67
27

ENCOURAGEMENT
Industrial
Utilities

* Industrial Companies n=121
Utility Companies n=74
The variables denote the following:
EMP: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers.
DEBT: the total debt to total equity ratio.
MATURITY: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers
divided by the number of retirees.
ACCRUE: whether the company accrued the OPEB costs
before the proposed standard became effective.
ENCOURAGEMENT: whether the company reported it was
encouraged by a professional association or industry
association to participate in lobbying activities for the
OPEB exposure draft.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the cop yrig ht ow ner. F urthe r rep rod uction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

descriptive statistics reveals that the industrial companies
are larger than the utility companies as measured by number
of employees (EMP). Although the mean DEBT for industrial
companies is similar to the mean DEBT for utility companies,
the standard deviations and maximum values are quite
different indicating that utility companies have a more
uniform debt ratio industrywide than do industrial
companies.

Also, utility companies have a larger median

DEBT (1.75) than industrial companies (1.47).

The means of

the MATURITY data reveal little difference between
industrial companies (28.09) and utility (29.12) companies,
however the medians are quite different and have reversed
with industrial companies having a higher median (5.50) than
utility companies (3.45).

The following section further

investigates these results.
This study found that most companies (187/195) account
for OPEB costs on the pay-as-you-go basis, which supports
previous research (Gerboth, 1988).

Since very few

respondents indicated that they accrued OPEB costs before
the effective date of the proposed standard, the research
hypothesis H4 could not be investigated.

Research

hypothesis H5 could not be examined because there were very
few "yes" responses when the sample was divided into
filers/nonfilers and favor/not favor.

Thus, these variables

are not included in subsequent tables.
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AMD DMIVARIATE TESTS

Table 4-6 presents selected descriptive statistics for
industrial companies and reports the results of univariate
tests of significance between means of the variables EMP,
DEBT, and MATURITY for (1) filers and nonfilers and (2)
companies that reported they favored the exposure draft and
companies that reported they did not favor the exposure
draft.

Table 4-7 reports analogous information for utility

companies.

The results indicate that the only statistically

significant difference occurs between the means of the
variable EMP for filers and nonfilers of the industrial
companies (p-value=.002).

Industrial filers are larger (as

measured by number of employees) than industrial nonfilers.
Thus, position choice for both industrial and utility
companies and lobbying participation choice of utility
companies cannot be attributed to any of these variables,
when considered individually.

ASSESSMENT OF MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions underlying use of the logistic
regression model are that the observations of the binary
dependent variable are statistically independent, the
relationship between the dependent variable and the
observable independent variables is nonlinear, and the
independent variables are not collinear.
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TABLE 4-6
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES
AND UNIVARIATE TESTS FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES*
Variable11

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

t°

r

valueo

EMP
Filers
Nonfilers

52246.23
10900.62

105192.51
24626.03

900
524

775099
170000

3.19

.002

Favor
Not Favor

27131.38
51421.78

42649.90
.133313.93

525
524

292000
775099

-1.12

.267

DEBT
Filers
Nonfilers

2.73
2.28

5.42
3.42

.19
.31

43.49
17.87

.55

.581

Favor
Not Favor

2.83
1.96

5.58
1.75

.19
.39

43.49
10.19

1.28

.202

MATURITY
Filers
Nonfilers

10.18
53.53

18.48
193.74

.26
.33

132.72
1332.00

-1.58

.121

Favor
Not Favor

34.40
15.31

152.61
34.14

.26
.78

1332.00
179.90

1.07

.286

“ Filers
Nonfilers
Favor
Not Favor

n=71
n=50
n=81
n=40

b The variables denote the following:
EMP: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers.
DEBT: the total debt to total equity ratio.
MATURITY: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers
divided by the number of retirees.
c Pooled or separate variance test used depending on
equality of variances.
d 2-tailed p-values

63

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the cop yrig ht ow ner. F urthe r rep rod uction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

TABLE 4-7
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR UTILITY COMPANIES
AND UNIVARIATE TESTS FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES6
Variable*

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

t°
value11

EMP
Filers
Nonfilers

11792.55
11343.43

22007.64
43588.63

679
504

47571
201399

.04

.964

Favor
Not Favor

12639.95
7830.67

32386.38
12178.40

504
536

201399
47571

.91

.364

DEBT
Filers
Nonfilers

2.62
2.22

3.38
1.12

.15
.46

20.72
5.12

.76

.447

Favor
Not Favor

2.36
3.07

2.70
3.70

.15
1.25

20.72
16.24

-.84

.405

MATURITY
Filers
Nonfilers

35.14
13.91

212.30
26.50

.33
1.70

1550.00
116.20

.71

.478

Favor
Not Favor

31.98
17.87

201.21
31.73

.33
1.35

1550.00
116.20

.51

.609

6 Filers

n=53
Nonfilers n=21
Favor
n=59
Not Favor n=15

b The variables denote the following:
EMP: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers.
DEBT: the total debt to total equity ratio.
MATURITY: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers
divided by the number of retirees.
c Pooled or separate variance test used depending on
equality of variances.
d 2-tailed p-values
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The assumption of independent observations of the
binary dependent variable (position choice model or lobbying
participation choice model) is satisfied because the
position taken on the OPEB issue was an independent decision
by the management of each firm.

Similarly, the lobbying

participation choice was also an independent decision.
Multicollinearity was analyzed by examining bivariate
correlations.

Table 4-8 presents the correlations between

variables for the industrial companies and for the utility
companies.

The largest absolute value of the correlations

between independent variables is .0590.

These independent

variables do not possess "harmful" levels of bivariate
collinearity.

In addition, the variance inflation factors

(VIF) obtained for the full (ordinary least squares)
regression models ranged from 1.004 to 1.205 indicating that
a multicollinearity problem does not exist.
The largest correlation for the dependent variable
lobbying participation choice (LPC) is with EMP (.2423).
The dependent variable position choice (PC) has the largest
absolute correlation with EMP (.1360).

RESULTS OF THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION PROCEDURE
Each research hypothesis was tested by examining the
sign and significance of the parameter estimate associated
with the variable appearing in the logistic regression
model.

The t-statistic for each variable represents a test
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TABLE 4-8
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BY INDUSTRY
Variable'

EMP

DEBT

MATURITY

DEPENDENT
PC

-. 1360b
(.0662)

.0879
(-.0983)

.0713
(.0317)

LPC

.2423
(.0069)

.0470
(.0624)

-.1696
(.0535)

1.0000

.0160
(.0509)

-.0590
(.0480)

INDEPENDENT
EMP

(1.0000)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

H H

DEBT

-.0423
(-.0580)

aThe variables denote the following:
PC:
position choice.
LPC: lobbying participation choice.
EMP: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers.
DEBT: the total debt to total equity ratio.
MATURITY: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers
divided by the number of retirees.
b Of the two correlations shown, the top one is for
industrial companies; the bottom for utility companies.
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of the null hypothesis that the corresponding parameter
equals zero.

The results of the logistic regression

analyses for the position choice model and the lobbying
participation choice model are reported in the following
sections.

THE POSITION CHOICE MODEL: INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES
Table 4-9 presents the parameter estimates, standard
errors, and tests of significance for the industrial
companies' position choice logistic regression model.

An

analysis of the studentized residuals does not reveal any
outliers and an analysis of the leverage values indicates
that there are no observations that have a large impact on
the predicted values.

This position choice model yields a

nonsignificant chi-square statistic of 4.243 with 3 degrees
of freedom (p-value=,2364). Consequently, as would be
expected, the tests of individual coefficients are also not
significant.

The pseudo R2 for this model is .5524.

Firm Size Hypothesis
The firm size research hypothesis (H,) states that the
larger the number of employees (EMP), the more likely it is
that the company representative reports having favored the
OPEB exposure draft.

The logistic regression analysis does

not support this statement (p-value=.8988). This result
does not support the findings of Hatts and Zimmerman (1978).
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TABLE 4-9

SUMMARY OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION
POSITION CHOICE MODEL FOR INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES8
Variableb

Expected
Sign'

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

td

one-tail
p-value

-1.2743

.8988

EMP

+

DEBT

_

.0698

.0734

.9501

.8290

MATURITY

+

.0023

.0037

.6227

.2668

.6212

.2706

Constant

3400E—05

.2670E-05

8 Model chi-square = 4.243 with 3 degrees of freedom

(p-value=.2364); None of the independent variables are
significant at .05 level.
bThe variables denote the following:
EMP: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers.
DEBT: the total debt to total equity ratio.
MATURITY: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers
divided by the number of retirees.
c The expected signs denote the following:
EMP(+): The larger the EMP variable, the more likely it
is that the company representative reports having
favored the OPEB exposure draft.
DEBT(-): The greater the DEBT variable, the less likely
it is that the company representative reports having
favored the OPEB exposure draft.
MATURITY(+): The greater the MATURITY variable (as the
maturity of a workforce decreases, the MATURITY
variable increases), the more likely it is that the
company representative reports having favored the OPEB
exposure draft.
d The t-statistic is obtained as the square root of the
wald statistic which is defined as the square of the
parameter estimate divided by the standard error.
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However, Saemann (1987) found firm size to be a
statistically significant predictor of position choice only
for nonfilers.

Saemann (1987) concluded that the

inconsistency between filers and nonfilers could be a result
of filers having different position choice models than
nonfilers.

The inclusion of filers and nonfilers in the

same model may be why the results were not statistically
significant for the firm size hypothesis.

Also, this study

measures firm size as the number of fulltime, nonseasonal
workers because it is the most relevant firm size measure
for the OPEB issue where previous research has defined firm
size in terms of assets and or sales.

Impact on Financial Statement Hypothesis
The impact on the financial statement research
hypothesis (H2) states that the greater the maturity of a
company's workforce (MATURITY), the less likely it is that
the company representative reports having favored the OPEB
exposure draft.15 The logistic regression analysis does
not support this statement (p-value=.2668). The
insignificance of the maturity variable may be an indication
15 Although there is an inverse relationship between the
maturity of a company's workforce and management's position on
the OPEB exposure draft, the expected sign of the parameter
estimate for the MATURITY variable is positive (+). Since
MATURITY is defined as the number of fulltime, nonseasonal
workers divided by the number of retirees, the MATURITY
variable will become smaller as the maturity of the workforce
increases.
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that the more important effect of the OPEB exposure draft is
the increase of the OPEB expense, which will be greater for
companies with an immature workforce (since the accrual
method results in a larger expense than does the pay-as-yougo method).

The field study performed by Coopers & Lybrand

for the Financial Executives Research Foundation (1989)
demonstrated that the maturity of the workforce was the
single predictor of the effect of the OPEB exposure draft on
the companies they examined.

The impact of the accrual of

OPEB costs on the income statement may be more pronounced
for companies with relatively few current retirees compared
to expected retirees in the future16 because they are
paying (and reporting as an expense) a fraction of the
postretirement benefits earned by employees when using the
pay-as-you-go method (Espahbodi, et al., 1991).

Leverage Position Hypothesis
The leverage position research hypothesis (H3) states
that the greater the debt to equity ratio before recognition
of the OPEB liability, the less likely it is that the
company representative reports having favored the OPEB
exposure draft.

The logistic regression analysis shows the

variable DEBT is not significant (p-value=.8290). This
result does not support the research hypothesis.

The

16 Relatively few current retirees to employees (expected
retirees) is defined as an "immature" workforce (with more
than six active employees for every retiree) (FERF, 1989).
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insignificance of the leverage position variable may be an
indication of the relative unimportance of the balance sheet
effect of the standard proposed in the OPEB exposure draft.
A recent editorial on the OPEB issue encouraged managers to
ignore the impact of the OPEB rule and concentrate on the
financial statements without the accrual of OPEB, just as
financial analysts have done (Petril, 1992).

THE POSITION CHOICE MODEL: UTILITY COMPANIES
Table 4-10 presents the parameter estimates, standard
errors, and tests of significance for the utility companies'
position choice logistic regression model.

An analysis of

the studentized residuals does not reveal any outliers and
an analysis of the leverage values indicates that there are
no observations that have a large impact on the predicted
values.

The utility companies' position choice model yields

a nonsignificant chi-square statistic of 1.091 with 3
degrees of freedom (p-value=.7794). The pseudo R2 is .4984.
The results of the position choice model for utility
companies are analogous to those obtained for the industrial
companies.

None of the research hypotheses were supported

by the logistic analysis.
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TABLE 4-10

SUMMARY OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION
POSITION CHOICE MODEL FOR UTILITY COMPANIES"
Variableb

Expected
Sign0

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

.8270E-05

.1563E-04

td

one-tail
p-value

EMP

+

.5292

.2983

DEBT

_

-.0673

.0837

-.8039

.2107

MATURITY

+

.0004

.0022

.1985

.4214

1.4559

.3974

Constant

Model chi-square = 1.091 with 3 degrees of freedom
(p-value=.7794); None of the independent variables are
significant at the .05 level.
b The variables denote the following:
EMP: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers.
DEBT: the total debt to total equity ratio.
MATURITY: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers
divided by the number of retirees.
cThe expected signs denote the following:
EMP(+): The larger the EMP variable, the more likely it
is that the company representative reports having
favored the OPEB exposure draft.
DEBT(-): The greater the DEBT variable, the less likely
it is that the company representative reports having
favored the OPEB exposure draft.
MATURITY(+): The greater the MATURITY variable (as the
maturity of a workforce decreases, the MATURITY
variable increases), the more likely it is that the
company representative reports having favored the OPEB
exposure draft.
d The t-statistic is obtained as the square root of the
wald statistic which is defined as the square of the
parameter estimate divided by the standard error.
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SUMMARY: THE POSITION CHOICE MODEL
Neither the industrial companies' nor the utility
companies' position choice model was significant.17 A
possible explanation for the difference in results obtained
in this research and previous research is that the proposed
OPEB exposure draft's effect on the income statement was
expected to be greater than its effect on the balance sheet.
Previous research has consistently found firm size, as
measured by assets and by sales (see Table 2-1), to be a
statistically significant factor in the position choice
taken by a firm.

In the present study, firm size is defined

as the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers since this
number relates to OPEB expense and liability whereas assets
and sales do not.

Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) studied a

portfolio of accounting choices; Holthausen and Leftwich
(1983) reviewed several accounting choice studies; and
Saemann (1987) investigated the pension issue which affects
more firms than the OPEB issue.

Thus, it is possible that

previous results may not generalize to other populations.
The univariate results for the EMP, DEBT, and MATURITY
variables are consistent with the logistic regression
results (i.e., not significant).

As in previous research by Saemann (1987), the position
choice model was also analyzed separately for filers and
nonfilers. The results were similar to the results reported
above, the model was not significant and neither were any
independent variables.
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THE LOBBYING PARTICIPATION CHOICE MODEL:
INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES
The parameter estimates, standard errors, and tests of
significance for the logistic regression model for lobbying
participation choice for industrial companies are reported
in Table 4-11.

An analysis of the studentized residuals

identified one observation as an outlier which then was
eliminated from the logistic regression analysis.

An

analysis of the leverage values indicates that there are no
observations that have a large impact on the predicted
values.

The industrial companies' lobbying participation

choice model yields a chi-square statistic of 52.109 with 3
degrees of freedom which is statistically significant (pvalue<.0001). The pseudo R2 for this model is .4869.

Firm Size Hypothesis
The firm size research hypothesis (Hg) states that the
larger the number of employees (EMP), the more likely it is
that the company representative participated in lobbying
activities for the OPEB exposure draft.

An examination of

the results of the logistic regression model reveals that
EMP is significant (p-value =.0001).

Consistent with

previous research (Francis (1987) and Saemann (1987)), which
defined firm size in terms of assets and/or sales, this
supports the research hypothesis that as firm size
increases, the more likely it is that the company
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TABLE 4-11

SUMMARY OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION
LOBBYING PARTICIPATION CHOICE MODEL
FOR INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES*
Variable*1

Expected
Signc

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

td

one-tall
p-value

EMP

+

.0001

.2275E-04

4.5137

.0001

DEBT

+

.0017

.0526

.0332

.4870

MATURITY

_

-.0083

.0078

-1.0610

.1444

-1.1104

.3882

Constant

*Model chi-square = 52.109 with 3 degrees of freedom
(p-value<.0001); EMP is the only significant variable.
bThe variables denote the following:
EMP: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers.
DEBT: the total debt to total equity ratio.
MATURITY: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers
divided by the number of retirees.
cThe expected signs denote the following:
EMP(+): The larger the EMP variable, the more likely it
is that the company representative participated in
lobbying activities for the OPEB exposure draft.
DEBT(+): The greater the DEBT variable, the more likely
it is that the company representative participated in
lobbying activities for the OPEB exposure draft.
MATURITY(-): The greater the MATURITY variable (as the
maturity of a workforce decreases, the MATURITY
variable increases), the less likely it is that the
company representative participated in lobbying
activities for the OPEB exposure draft.
d The t-statistic is obtained as the square root of the
wald statistic which is defined as the square of the
parameter estimate divided by the standard error.
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representative participated in lobbying activities for the
OPEB exposure draft.

Impact on Financial statement Hypothesis

The impact on financial statement research hypothesis
(H7) states that the greater the maturity of a company's
workforce (MATURITY), the more likely it is that the company
representative participated in lobbying activities for the
OPEB exposure draft.18 The logistic regression analysis
does not support this statement (p-value=.1444).

The

insignificant result may be explained by concern over the
increase in expense for companies with an immature workforce
rather than the financial statement effect for companies
with a mature workforce.

Companies with relatively few

retirees to the number of employees19 (immature workforce)
will be increasing their OPEB expense over the pay-as-you-go
method.

For firms using the pay-as-you-go method of

accounting, the accrued expense (when the standard becomes
effective) may be significantly more pronounced than the

18 Although there is an inverse relationship between the
maturity of a company's workforce and management's position on
the OPEB exposure draft, the expected sign of the parameter
estimate for the MATURITY variable is positive (+). Since
MATURITY is defined as the number of fulltime, nonseasonal
workers divided by the number of retirees, the MATURITY
variable will become smaller as the maturity of the workforce
increases.
19 Relatively few retirees to the number of employees is
defined as more than six active employees for every retiree by
FERF (1989).
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currently reported expense using the pay-as-you-go method
(Espahbodi, et al., 1991).

Leverage Position Hypothesis

The leverage position research hypothesis (Hs) states
that the greater the debt to equity ratio before recognition
of the OPEB liability, the more likely it is that the
company representative participated in lobbying activities
for the OPEB exposure draft.

This variable, DEBT, was not

found to be significant (p-value=.4870), thus the research
hypothesis is not supported.

This result does not support

previous research by Dhaliwal (1982) or Francis (1987).

The

insignificant results for the leverage position variable may
indicate that filers expected lesser importance of the
balance sheet effect of the proposed standard compared to
the income statement effect.

THE LOBBYING PARTICIPATION CHOICE MODEL:
UTILITY COMPANIES

The parameter estimates, standard errors, and tests of
significance for the logistic regression model for lobbying
participation choice for utility companies' are reported in
Table 4-12.

An analysis of the studentized residuals does

not reveal any outliers and an analysis of the leverage
values indicates that there are no observations that have a
large impact on the predicted values.

The utility
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TABLE 4-12

SUMMARY OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION
LOBBYING PARTICIPATION CHOICE MODEL
FOR UTILITY COMPANIES”
Variable11

Expected
Sign

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

t*

one-tail
p-value

EMP

+

— .7700E-07

.9048E-05

-.0085

.5034

DEBT

+

.0626

.1151

.5432

.2935

MATURITY

_

.0010

.0024

.4406

.6702

.7540

.3789

Constant

"Model chi-square = .629 with 3 degrees of freedom
(p-value=.8897); None of the independent variables are
significant at .05 level.
b The variables denote the following:
EMP: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers.
DEBT: the total debt to total equity ratio.
MATURITY: the number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers
divided by the number of retirees.
eThe expected signs denote the following:
EMP(+): The larger the EMP variable, the more likely it
is that the company representative participated in
lobbying activities for the OPEB exposure draft.
DEBT(+): The greater the DEBT variable, the more likely
it is that the company representative participated in
lobbying activities for the OPEB exposure draft.
MATURITY(-): The greater the MATURITY variable (as the
maturity of a workforce decreases, the MATURITY
variable increases), the less likely it is that the
company representative participated in lobbying
activities for the OPEB exposure draft.
d The t-statistic is obtained as the square root of the
wald statistic which is defined as the square of the
parameter estimate divided by the standard error.
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nonsignificant chi-square statistic of .629 with 3 degrees
of freedom (p-value=.8897). The pseudo R2 for this model is
.5422.

The results of the lobbying participation choice

model for utility companies are analogous to those obtained
for the position choice models.

None of the research

hypotheses were supported by the logistic analysis.

SUMMARY: TEE LOBBYING PARTICIPATION CHOICE MODEL
The number of employees (representing firm size) was
found to be significant in the logistic regression analysis
for industrial companies only.

This result indicates that

firm size is the most important factor in determining an
industrial company's lobbying participation choice for the
OPEB exposure draft.

The larger the number of employees,

the more likely it is that the industrial company's
representative participated in lobbying activities for the
OPEB exposure draft.

This result is consistent with

previous research which used various other surrogates to
measure firm size.
None of the other research hypotheses were supported
for either industrial companies or utility companies.

The

univariate results were consistent with the logistic
regression analysis revealing only number of employees to be
a significant factor in lobbying participation choice for
industrial companies.
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The difference in logistic analysis results between
industrial companies and utility companies may be because
utility companies may have different motivations for
lobbying since they are regulated companies with regulated
rates.

Previous studies do not specify if utilities are

included in their samples which would also explain the
inconsistency in results.

SYNOPSIS

This chapter described the results of the survey data
collection procedures, descriptive statistics, univariate
tests, validity of the logistic regression assumptions, and
the tests of the hypotheses.

There were 195 usable

responses, of which 124 (43.21% response rate) were filers
and 71 (21.07% response rate) were nonfilers.

Industry

distribution of the respondents was compared to that of the
population surveyed.

The results of chi-square goodness of

fit tests indicated that the sample of filers does not
appear to be representative of the target population;
therefore, the logistic analysis was performed for two data
sets, one for the industrial companies and one for the
utility companies.

Nonresponse bias was tested by the

early/late hypothesis.

The results indicated that

nonresponse bias is not present.
Descriptive statistics were presented and univariate
tests of significance were conducted on the independent
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variables.

Only the size variable (EMP) for industrial

companies was found to be significant in the lobbying
participation choice model.
Correlation coefficients were examined for bivariate
collinearity.

No absolute correlation between independent

variables exceeded .0590, indicating that multicollinearity
is not a problem.

In addition, the variance inflation

factors (VIF) confirmed the diagnosis.
The research hypotheses for the position choice model—
firm size, impact on financial statements, and leverage
position— were not supported by logistic regression
analysis of either data set.

Only one research hypothesis

for the lobbying participation choice model was supported in
the logistic regression analyses— the research hypothesis
for firm size for industrial companies.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a summary of the study,
conclusions, limitations, and recommendations for future
research.

SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

The Mission Statement of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board includes the precept, "to weigh carefully
the views of its constituents in developing concepts and
standards" (FASB, 1992, p.l).

To enable the FASB to weigh

the views of its constituency, the FASB must be aware of the
factors involved in the lobbying participation and position
decisions made by corporate representatives.

The purpose of

this study is to explain and classify the behavior of
corporate managers in the accounting standards setting
process as it related to statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 106.

Knowledge about why corporate managers

choose to participate in the standards setting process for
postretirement benefits other than pensions is expected to
provide insight about the entire constituency of the FASB,
not only the respondents.
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To accomplish the objective, corporate representatives
who responded to the FASB's exposure draft "Employers'
Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions,"
were surveyed in an effort to determine corporate
characteristics that explain position choice and lobbying
participation choice on this issue.

A sample of

corporations whose representatives did not respond to the
OPEB exposure draft, (although the corporations did provide
OPEB benefits and are of a similar industry distribution as
firms which did respond) was also surveyed to capture
corporate characteristics to explain their position and
their decision not to lobby.
The research hypotheses developed and tested in this
study related to two decisions made by management: (1) the
position choice, and (2) the lobbying participation choice.
Prior research was analyzed to determine variables that were
found to be consistently predictive in these two decisions.
The comment letters the FASB received were read to determine
the position taken by each comment letter writer and factors
mentioned in those letters supporting the position choice
taken.

The integration of these sources resulted in the

hypotheses to determine variables expected to explain the
position choice and lobbying participation choice made by
management.

Three variables were incorporated into the

analysis: (1) firm size (measured by the number of fulltime
nonseasonal employees), (2) the expected impact of the
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exposure draft on financial statements20 (estimated by the
maturity of the workforce), and (3) the leverage position
(measured by the total debt to total equity ratio).
The hypotheses were tested by developing two logistic
regression models, (1) one in which the dependent variable
was the position taken on the OPEB exposure draft and (2)
one in which the dependent variable was lobbying
participation choice.

Data were obtained from the NAARS and

the Disclosure Incorporated databases, Standard & Poor's
Compustat Tapes, Moody's Corporate Manuals, and two
questionnaires developed for this study.

The comment

letters filed with the FASB on the OPEB exposure draft were
also read to obtain data.

These data were used to construct

logistic regression models to test the relationships between
the dependent and the independent variables.
A questionnaire was mailed to representatives of two
groups of firms: (1) 287 firms which replied to the FASB's
OPEB exposure draft (filers), and (2) 337 firms which did
not reply to the FASB's OPEB exposure draft (nonfilers).

Of

the 195 usable responses, 124 were from filers and 71 from
nonfilers.
was evident.

The data were tested for nonresponse bias; none
Goodness of fit tests revealed that the

industry distribution of the sample of nonfilers is
representative of the target population; but the sample of
20 The specific impact on the financial statements in the
year of adoption is heavily dependent on the transition
approach (FERF, 1989).
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filers is not, as it includes proportionally more utility
companies.

Therefore, separate logistic regression models

were developed for industrial companies and utility
companies.
Univariate tests of significance by industry were
performed to identify systematic differences between (l)
firms favoring and firms not favoring the OPEB exposure
draft and (2) filers and nonfilers.

These tests revealed

the only statistically significant result to be that
industrial companies that filed are larger (as measured by
number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers) than industrial
companies that did not file.
Logistic regression analysis was used to identify
statistically significant variables in the position choice
and in the lobbying participation choice decisions.

The

overall significance of each logistic regression model was
determined by examining chi-square statistics of each model.
The research hypotheses were tested by examining tests of
significance for the parameter estimates.

CONCLUSIONS 07 THE STUDY
The logistic regression analysis for industrial
companies' position choice produced a model chi-square
statistic of 4.243 which is not statistically significant
(p-value=.2364). The logistic regression analysis for
utility companies' position choice produced a model chi85
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square statistic of 1.091 which is not statistically
significant (p-value=.7794). The logistic regression
analysis for industrial companies' lobbying participation
choice produced a model chi-square statistic of 52.109 which
is statistically significant (p-value<.0001). The logistic
regression analysis for utility companies' lobbying
participation choice produced a model chi-square of .629
which is not statistically significant (p-value=.8897).

Conclusions of the Position Choice Hypotheses
The research hypotheses that the position choice (for
both industrial companies and utility companies) is related
to (1) firm size (measured by the number of fulltime,
nonseasonal employees), (2) impact on the financial
statements (estimated by maturity of the workforce), or (3)
leverage position (measured by total debt to total equity)
were not supported.
previous research.

These results are not consistent with
A possible explanation for the

inconsistency is that prior research has not included
nonfilers in their studies of position choice (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1978; and Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981).

Saemann

(1987), who did include nonfilers, used separate models for
filers and nonfilers.

Therefore, the results from Saemann's

study may not be generalizable to situations where filers
and nonfilers are included in the same model (as in this
study).
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The insignificance of the maturity variable may be an
indication that the more important effect of the OPEB
exposure draft is the increase of the OPEB expense, which
will be greater for companies with an immature workforce
(since the accrual method results in a larger expense than
does the pay-as-you-go method). The field study performed
by Coopers & Lybrand for the Financial Executives Research
Foundation (1989) demonstrated that the maturity of the
workforce was the single predictor of the effect of the OPEB
exposure draft on the companies they examined.

The impact

of the OPEB exposure draft on the income statement may be
more pronounced for companies with relatively few current
retirees compared to expected retirees21 in the future
because they are paying (and reporting as an expense) a
fraction of the postretirement benefits earned by employees
when using the pay-as-you-go method (Espahbodi, et al.,
1991).
The variables representing firm size and leverage
position were not found to be significant.

Their lack of

significance may reflect the uncertainty of corporate
representatives in predicting OPEB costs using the accrual
method.

Due to the complexity of implementation of the

proposed new standard, corporate representatives may have

21

Relatively few current retirees to expected retirees
is defined by FERF (1989) as more than six active employees
for every retiree.
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been unsure of the effect the OPEB standard would have on
their company.

Conclusions of the Lobbying Participation Choice Hypotheses
Only one research hypothesis for the lobbying
participation choice model was supported— the firm size
hypothesis for industrial companies.
hypotheses—

The other research

leverage position, impact of financial

statements, and utility companies' firm size were not
supported.
Except for industrial companies' firm size hypothesis,
these results are not consistent with previous research.
Previous research which has found leverage to be significant
include Dhaliwal (1982), Francis (1987), and Deakin (1989).
Saemann's (1987) results were consistent with this research,
finding no significance for the leverage variable.

However,

while Francis and Deakin found significance, leverage was
measured as net pension liability divided by assets in
Francis' study and measured as debt covenant costs in
Deakin's study.

The different measurement methods may

explain the inconsistency in results.
The impact on the financial statements variable was not
found to be significant.

As mentioned previously, this

result may be because filers expected the income statement
effect of the proposed OPEB standard to be more important
than the balance sheet effect.
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Consistent with previous research, larger industrial
companies (as measured by number of fulltime, nonseasonal
workers) are more likely to participate in OPEB lobbying
activities than are smaller industrial companies.

Utility

companies may not be motivated by the same economic
consequences as industrial firms because of the regulatory
environment (which regulates rates) within which utilities
operate.

Previous studies do not specify the type of firms,

and the present study is unable to ascertain if utilities
are included.

The exclusion of utility companies in

previous research may explain the inconsistency in results
of this study and earlier lobbying participation choice
studies.
Synopsis

This study has identified several factors involved in
the lobbying participation and position decisions made by
corporate representatives.

Firm size, measured by the

number of fulltime, nonseasonal workers, was found to be the
single significant factor for industrial companies' lobbying
participation choice.

As firm size increases, it is more

likely that industrial companies participate in lobbying
activities for the OPEB exposure draft.

Knowledge that

industrial lobbyists are larger than industrial nonlobbyists
may encourage the FASB to target smaller firms when
encouraging constituents to participate in lobbying
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activities.

Increased participation could lead to a more

effective accounting standards setting process.
Other survey results identified the belief that
commenting would not affect the FASB's final statement as
the number one reason for company representatives not to
participate in lobbying activities for the OPEB exposure
draft.

A more effective accounting standards setting

process may be developed if the FASB could demonstrate to
their constituency how the comment letters are evaluated and
incorporated into their decision process.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
A limitation of this study is the use of the NAARS and
Disclosure Incorporated databases to identify firms that
provide postretirement benefits other than pensions.
Selecting firms from these databases may introduce a bias
since the population of all such firms was not used for
sample selection.

Obviously, the extent of this bias, if

any, is indeterminate.
Another limitation of this study is the exclusion of
firms with less than 500 employees.

There are firms with

less than 500 employees that provide postretirement benefits
other than pensions to which the results of this study
cannot be generalized.

However, the exclusion of firms with

less than 500 employees is preferred since the small size of
these firms could inherently lead to other variables being
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deemed more important.

Firms with less than 500 employees

have a delayed effective date for the OPEB accounting
standard and therefore the decision to lobby may not have
been the same for these companies as it was for public
companies and larger, nonpublic companies.

Hence, the

results of this study may not pertain to firms with less
than 500 employees.
An additional limitation of this study is that the
industry distribution of the survey respondents who filed
comment letters to the FASB does not appear to be
representative of the target population.

Survey respondents

who were filers included proportionally more utility
companies, thus, separate logistic regression models for
industrial and utility companies were analyzed.
Another limitation of this research is the lack of a
variable representing the lobbying activities encouraged by
a professional and/or an. industry association.

Due to a

limited number of "yes" responses when the sample was
divided into filers/nonfilers and favor/not favor, research
hypothesis Hs investigating the encouragement by
professional and/or industry associations could not be
examined.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several recommendations for future research
that may be drawn from the results of this study.

The

income statement effect of the OPEB exposure draft needs to
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be investigated further.

It is ppssible that a variable

representing maturity of workforce and labor intensity
(measured by sales divided by maturity) may reflect the
income statement effect.

This research found that the

balance sheet effect is not significant, however, the income
statement effect may be relevant to both the position choice
and the lobbying participation choice.
There may also be different decision variables for
firms with mature workforces and firms with immature
workforces.

Future research could investigate this issue by

comparing the corporate characteristics of these two groups.
Future research may also consider measuring the
leverage variable with expected OPEB liability plus total
liabilities divided by total equity.

This measurement

method would include the magnitude of expected effect of
OPEB on liabilities as well as the leverage position of the
firm.
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APPENDIX A
FIRMS THAT FILED COMMENT LETTERS
TO THE FASB ON THE OPEB EXPOSURE DRAFT
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Utility Companies

There were 86 utility companies of 287 corporate
representatives (29.97%) that filed comment letters with the
FASB for the OPEB exposure draft. These utility companies and
the corresponding number of employees are listed below.
Number of Employees
Alltel Corporation
7,918
American Water Works Company, Incorporated
3,911
American Electric Power Service Corporation 22,273
Ameritech
77,326
Arizona Public Service
Company
8,135
Arkansas Power & Light
Company
4,673
Arkla, Incorporated
1,700
AT&T
283,500
Atlantic Electric
2,052
Bell Atlantic
79,099
Brooklyn Union Gas
2,533
Carolina Power & Light
Company
8,726
Centerior Energy
9,091
Central and South West ServicesIncorporated 8,468
Central Vermont Public Service Corporation
760
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company
4,972
Columbia Gas
10.844
Commonwealth Edison
17.844
Commonwealth Energy System
2,589
1,950
Connecticut Water Services, Incorporated
20,150
Consolidated Edison Company of New York
Consumers Power Company
9,614
Contel Corporation
22,000
Corning Natural Gas Corporation
679
Delmarva Power
2,696
Detroit Edison
10,045
Dominion Resources, Incorporated
13,342
Duke Power Company
19,683
Eastern Enterprises
4,099
El Paso Company
1,082
ENRON Corporation
6,299
10,416
ENSERCH Corporation
13,086
Entergy Services, Incorporated
7,489
Florida Progress Corporation
18,899
FPL Group, Incorporated
13,721
General Public Utilities Corporation
158,000
GTE Service Corporation
4,948
Gulf States Utilities Company
12,877
Houston Industries Incorporated
1,562
Idaho Power Company
2,278
Indianapolis Power & Light Company
1,542
Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company
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K N Energy, Incorporated
Kentucky Utilities
KPL Gas Service
MCN Corporation
National Fuel
New York State Electric & Gas Corporation
New England Power Service
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Northeast Utilities
Northern States Power Company
NYNEX Corporation
Ohio Edison
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Pacific Enterprises
Pacific Telesis Group
Pacificorp
Panhandle Eastern Corporation
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
Potomac Electric Power Company
PSI Holdings Incorporated
Public Service Company of Colorado
Public Service Enterprise Group
Public Service Company of New Mexico
Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation
Rochester Telephone Corporation
San Diego Gas & Electric
Sonat Incorporated
Southern California Gas Company
Southern New England Telecommunications
Southern California Edison Company
Southern Company
Southwestern Bell Corporation
Tenneco Incorporated
Texas Utilities Company
Texas-New Mexico Power Company
Transco Energy Company
United Illuminating Company
US West, Incorporated
Valero Energy Corporation
Virginia Power
Washington Gas
Washington Water Power Company
Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation

1
2
4
3
3
4
1
11
8
8
95
7
26
43
68
15
6
8
5
4
6
13
3
2
3
4
4
9
12
16
31
66
90
15
1
5
1
70
1
13
3
2
4
2

704
085
460
508
539
565
570
193
279
104
399
070
229
890
451
215
099
243
400
198
619
049
154
639
686
638
799
345
646
660
282
199
000
774
077
527
626
586
815
102
222
447
940
417
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Industrial Companies

There were 201 industrial companies of 287 corporate
representatives (70.03%) that filed comment letters with the
FASB for the OPEB exposure draft. These industrial companies
and the corresponding number of employees are listed below.
Number of Employees
A.O. Smith Corporation
Abbott Laboratories
Acme-Cleveland Corporation
Air Products and Chemicals, Incorporated
Alcan Aluminum Limited
Allied-Signal Incorporated
Aluminum Company of America
AMAX Incorporated
Amerada Hess Corporation
American Brands, Incorporated
American Cyanamid Company
American Home Products Corporation
American International Group, Incorporated
American Standard Incorporated
Ametek
Amoco Corporation
Anheuser-Busch Companies
Arch Mineral Corporation
Aristech Chemical Corporation
ASARCO Incorporated
Baker Hughes
BASF Corporation
Batus Incorporated
Bausch & Lomb
Baxter Healthcare Corporation
Bechtel Group, Incorporated
Bethlehem Steel Corporation
Black Clawson Company
BMC Industries, Incorporated
Boeing Company
Bonneville International Corporation
Borden, Incorporated
Borg-Warner Corporation
BP America
Bristol-Myers Company
Budd Company
CalMat Company
Campbell Soup Company
Caterpillar Incorporated
CBS Records
Champion International Corporation
Chesapeake Corporation
Chevron Corporation

9,899
40,928
2,582
14,099
57,000
107,099
60,599
20,000
8,739
47,299
35,393
50,815
1,000
38,900
5,899
53,652
46,607
4,569
1,700
9,000
20,399
374,000
40,000
12,500
64,299
20,000
30,500
1,100
2,108
164,500
900
46,500
82,600
39,969
54,099
14,000
2,909
55,411
60,408
6,750
29,599
4,944
54,825
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Chrysler Corporation
CXBA-GEI6Y Corporation
Comerica
Consolidated Rail Corporation
Corning Incorporated
CPC International Incorporated
Crane Company
CSX Corporation
Cummins Engine Company, Incorporated
Dana Corporation
Deere & Company
Delta Air Lines, Incorporated
DeSoto, Incorporated
Diamond Shamrock
Digital Equipment Corporation
Dow Corning Corporation
Dow Chemical Company
Dresser Industries
E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Company
Eastman Kodak Company
Eaton Corporated
Ecolab Center
Emerson Electric Company
Engelhard Corporation
Exxon Corporation
F. W. Woolworth Company
Fieldcrest Cannon, Incorporated
FMC Corporation
Ford Motor Company
Gates Corporation
General Mills, Incorporated
General Electric Company
General Motors Corporation
Georgia-Pacific Corporation
Gerber Products Company
Gillette Company
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
Graybar Electric Company Incorporated
Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation
Growmark
H. J. Heinz Company
Halliburton Company
Hercules Incorporated
Hershey Foods Corporation
Hewlett Packard Company
Hoffman-LaRoche
Honeywell, Incorporated
Household International
Imperial Oil Company
Inland Steel Industries
International Business Machines Corporation
International Paper

129
14
7
31
27
33
10
53
25
37
38
58
1
5
125
7
62
31
145
137
38
13
72
8
104
138
20
24
366
13
97
292
775
44
12
30
109
4
20
37
65
23
11
95
10
72
14
15
20
383
63

000
000
160
573
500
500
699
096
099
500
948
783
819
000
799
600
110
399
786
750
733
089
599
099
000
000
415
109
640
000
237
000
099
000
434
399
898
600
000
659
299
500
289
799
000
000
645
500
247
714
219
500

103

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the cop yrig ht ow ner. F urthe r rep rod uction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

ITT Corporation
J.C. Penney Company, Incorporated
J. P. Morgan
Johnson & Johnson
K Mart Corporation
Kellogg Company
Kerr-McGee Corporation
Keystone Health System
Kimberly-Clark Corporation
Knight-Ridder, Incorporated
Lehigh Portland Cement Company
Levi Strauss Associates Incorporated
Libbey-Owens Ford Company
Liebel-Florsheim Company
Lockheed Corporation
LTV Corporation
Lubrizol
Manville Corporation
Martin Marietta Corporation
McDonald's Corporation
McDonnell Douglas
McGraw-Hill, Incorporated
Medusa Corporation
Memorial Hospital
Merck & Company
Midlantic Corporation
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Mobil Corporation
Monsanto Company
Moore Corporation Limited
Mosler, Incorporated
Motorola Incorporated
National Railroad Passenger Corporation
National Steel
National Gypsum Company
Navistar International Transportation
NCR Corporation
Northern Telecom Limited
Northwest Airlines, Incorporated
Norton Company
Occidental Petroleum Corporation
Ocean Spray Cranberries, Incorporated
Olin
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation
Pfizer Incorporated
Philip Morris Companies, Incorporated
Phillips Petroleum Company
Pic-n-Save
Pitney Bowes
Polaroid Corporation
Potlatch Corporation
PPG Industries, Incorporated

117,000
198,000
14,206
83,099
365,000
17,267
7,941
628
39,663
21,000
1,900
31,000
2,347
530
82,500
38,000
5,306
17,000
65,500
176,000
127,925
14,460
899
576

34,399
12,181
87,583
67,899
42,178
26,358
1,200
104,000
23,000
12,200
6,500
14,236
56,000
47,571
33,200
16,100
53,500
12,300
15,399
18,599
42,099
157,000
21,799
3,700
31,403
11,440
7,370
35,500

104

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the cop yrig ht ow ner. F urthe r rep rod uction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

Premark International, Incorporated
Proctor & Gamble Company
Pulitzer Publishing Group
Quaker State Corporation
Raytheon Company
Reynolds Metals Company
RJR Nabisco, Incorporated
Rockwell International Corporation
Rohm and Haas Company
Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies
Rubbermaid Incorporated
Sara Lee Corporation
Schering-Plough Corporation
Scott Paper Company
Seagrams Company LTD.
Sears, Roebuck and Company
Servistar Corporation
Shell oil Company
Sherlock Company
Society Corporation
Squibb Corporation
Standard Supply & Hardware Company
Stanley Works
Sun Company
Syntex Corporation
Tasty Baking Company
Texaco, Incorporated
Texas Instruments
Textron Incorporated
Tektronix, Incorporated
Times Mirror
Timken Company
TRW Incorporated
Union Carbide Corporation
Union Camp Corporation
Union Pacific Corporation
United Technologies
United Airlines
Unocal Corporation
Upjohn Company
USAIR Group, Incorporated
UST
USX Corporation
Vulcan Materials Company
W.R. Grace & Company
Warner-Lambert Company
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Wetterau Incorporated
Whitman Corporation
Willamette Industries, Incorporated
Williams Companies, Incorporated
Wyatt Company

24,699
79,000
3,200
5,621
77,599
30,500
116,881
108,714
13,039
135,000
8,408
101,799
21,299
29,399
17,599
500,000
1,100
31,338
1,200
5,934
54,099
531
18,463
21,607
10,000
1,599
37,066
73,853
58,000
15,700
29,065
17,247
74,279
45,986
18,645
48,125
201,399
71,169
17,285
20,099
49,000
3,336
25,553
6,275
49,699
33,099
121,962
12,100
25,187
9,370
4,250
540
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Xerox Corporation
Yellow Freight System

111,399
29,199
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE OF FIRMS USED IN THIS STUDY
THAT DID NOT FILE COMMENT LETTERS
TO THE FASB ON THE OPEB EXPOSURE DRAFT
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Utility Companies

There were 93 utility companies of 337 corporate
representatives (27.60%) that provide postretirement benefits
other than pensions and did not file comment letters with the
FASB on the OPEB exposure draft. These utility companies and
the corresponding number of employees are listed below.
Number of Employees
Alabama Power Company
Appalachian Power Company
Atlantic City Electric Company
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Bangor Hydro Electric Company
Bay State Gas Company
Boston Gas Company
Berkshire Gas Company
Bonneville Pacific Corporation
Boston Edison Company
Cascade Natural Gas Corporation
Centel Corporation
Central Illinois Public Service Company
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation
Central Louisiana Electric Company
Central Maine Power Company
Central Power and Light Company
Century Telephone Enterprises Incorporated
Chesapeake Utilities Corporation
Cilcorp Incorporated
Cincinnati Bell Incorporated
Citizens Utilities Company
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company
CNW Corporation
Columbus Southern Power Company
Connecticut Energy
Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation
Consumers Water Company
DPL Incorporated
DQE
Eastern Utilities Associates
Energen Corporation
Florida Power & Light
Florida Public Utilities Company
Georgia Power Company
Green Mountain Power Corporation
GTI Corporation
Hawaii Electric Industries
Illinois Power Company
Indiana Energy Incorporated
Indiana Michigan Power Company

9,700
4,780
2,150
9,100
504
1,000
1,800
581
530
4,560
536
12,500
2,670
1,350
1,280
2,490
2,330
2,000
515
1,520
11,000
1,670
5,300
8,800
2,500
644
695
888
2,790
4,350
1,200
1,500
15,000
598
15,100
586
883
3,190
4,240
1,130
3,510
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Interstate Power Company
Iowa Public Service Company
Iowa Power Incorporated
Iowa Resources Incorporated
Iowa Southern Incorporated
Ipalco Enterprises Incorporated
Kentucky Power Company
Lincoln Telecommunications Company
Louisville Gas and Electric Company
Lousiana General Services Incorporated
Madison Gas and Electric Company
Michigan Gas Company
Midwest Energy Company
Minnesota Power & Light
Monongahela Power Company
Montana Power Company
New England Electric Systems
New Jersey American Water Company
New Jersey Resources Corporation
Nicor Incorporated
Nipsco Industries Incorporated
Northern Illinois Gas Company
NUI Corporation
Ohio Bell Telephone Company
Oneok Incorporated
Orange and Rockland Utilities Incorporated
Oregon Electric Company
Otter Tail Power Company
Pacific Resources Incorporated
Peoples Energy Corporation
Philadelphia Suburban Corporation
Public Service Company of Oklahoma
Savannah Electric and Power Company
Sierra Pacific Resources
Southeastern Michigan Gas Enterprises
Southern California Water Company
Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company
Southwestern Public Service Company
St. Louis County Water Company
Texas Eastern Corporation
Toledo Edison Company
UCG Energy Corporation
UGI Corporation
United Water Resources Incorporated
United Telecommunications Incorporated
UtiliCorp United Incorporated
Upper Penninsula Energy Corporation
West Penn Power Company
West Texas Utilities Company
Wisconsin Bell Incorporated
Wisconsin Energy Corporation
Wisconsin Gas Company

950
1,880
1,220
1,300
550
2,280
868
1,500
4,180
652
807
598
2,230
2,430
1,900
3,690
5,480
700
810
4,000
4,825
2,600
967
13,500
2,141
1,780
12,310
828
902
3,400
1,200
2,000
643
1,870
590
592
970
2,000
542
9,300
2,820
975
2,100
729
41,300
2,560
582
2,040
1,390
6,670
5,600
1,430
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Industrial Companies

There were 244 industrial companies of 337 corporate
representatives (72.40%) that provide postretirement benefits
other than pensions and did not file comment letters with the
FASB on the OPEB exposure draft. These industrial companies
and the corresponding number of employees are listed below.
Number of Employees
A H Belo Corporation
Acme Steel
Alexander & Alexander Services Incorporated
Allegheny Ludlum Corporation
Allis Chalmers Corporation
American Greetings Corporation
Allergan, Incorporated
American Petrofina Incorporated
AMR Corporation
Amsted Industries
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation
AON Corporation
ARCO Chemical Company
Armstrong World Industries
Arvin Industries Incorporated
Avon Products Incorporated
Badger Meter Incorporated
Bandag Incorporated
Banner Industries Incorporated
Barnes Group Incorporated
Beatrice Company
BFGoodrich Company
Bird Incorporated
Black & Decker
Blount Incorporated
Brenco Incorporated
Briggs & Stratton Corporation
Brown Group Incorporated
Brush Wellman Incorporated
Burlington Northern Incorporated
Butler Manufacturing Company
Cadmus Communications Corporation
Cargill Incorporated
CBI Industries Incorporated
CENEX
CF&I Steel Corporation
Chicago and North Western Holdings
Coachmen Industries Incorporated
Chiquita Brands International Incorporated
Cincinnati Milacron Incorporated
Citgo Petroleum Corporation
Citizens and Southern Corporation

2,562
3,000
16,000
5,500
516
20,700
6,435
3,694
89,000
8,100
784
1,000
3,580
25,606
16,849
28,399
837
2,456
17,160
4,798
15,900
11,891
1,000
38,600
5,000
600
7,315
28,000
2,159
32,899
3,644
1,950
54,000
11,500
2,600
2,000
7,562
2,664
44,000
7,675
1,652
15,381
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Clarcor Incorporated
Clark Equipment Company
Coca Cola Enterprises Incorporated
Commerce Clearing House Incorporated
Commercial Metals Company
Commercial Intertech Corporation
Consolidated Freightways Incorporated
Control Data Corporation
Cordis Corporation
Corning Glass Works
Crystal Brands Incorporated
Curtiss Wright Corporation
Cyclops Industries Incorporated
Data General Corporation
Dayton Hudson Corporation
Deluxe Corporation
Dexter Corporation
DeZurik Incorporated
Diebold Incorporated
Domtar Incorporated
Donnelly Corporation
Doskocil Companies Incorporated
Driver Harris Company
Durr Fillauer Medical Incorporated
E Systems Incorporated
Echlin Incorporated
Electronic Associates Incorporated
Equifax Incorporated
Ethyl Corporation
Farah Incorporated
Federal Express Corporation
Federal Signal Corporation
Freeport McMoran Incorporated
Gannett Company Incorporated
Gencorp
General Dynamics Corporation
General Signal Corporation
Genesco Incorporated
Genrad Incorporated
Global Marine Incorporated
Goulds Pumps Incorporated
Griffith Consumers Company
Guy F Atkinson Company of California
Hal Incorporated
Hancock Fabrics Incorporated
Hanna (M.A.) Company
Harley Davidson Incorporated
Hasbro Incorporated
Hecla Mining Company
Herley Microwave Systems Incorporated
Hibernia Corporation
Holnam Incorporated

2,289
9,182
20,000
7,782
3,433
4,000
40,799
18,000
1,870
650
10,399
2,049
6,799
13,739
140,000
16,947
5,399
1,300
4,182
15,818
2,149
10,000
558
1,263
17,919
16,199
539
12,713
5,500
6,700
86,799
4,317
7,327
36,649
15,099
102,200
19,377
6,699
1,868
1,600
4,200
534
6,047
3,074
6,422
9,337
5,089
8,199
906
517
3,700
2,694
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Homestake Mining Company
Hudson Foods Incorporated
Interco Incorporated
IE Industries
Illinois Tool Works Incorporated
IMC Fertilizer Group Incorporated
Imcera Group Incorporated
IMO Industries Incorporated
Ingersoll Rand Company
Intel Corporation
Interlake Corporation
Intermet Corporation
International Multifoods Corporation
Intermark Incorporated
J P Industries Incorporated
Jefferson Smurfit Corporation
Joslyn Corporation
Joy Technologies Incorporated
Kellwood Company
Keycorp
Kroger Company
Kysor Industrial Corporation
LaBarge Corporation
Land O'Lakes Incorporated
Leucadia National Corporation
Lifetouch National School Studios
Loews Corporation
Longview Fibre Company
LPL Technologies Incorporated
LS Starrett Company
Mack Trucks
Magma Copper Company
Manitowoc Company Incorporated
Mark IV Industries Incorporated
Marshall & Ilsey Corporation
Material Sciences Corporation
Maytag Corporation
McCormick & Company Incorporated
McDermott International Incorporated
Medtronic Incorporated
MEI Diversified Incorporated
Meredith Corporation
Michigan National Corporation
Mine Safety Appliances Company
Missouri Research Lab
Mitchell Energy & DevelopmentCorporation
Modine Manufacturing Corporation
Montgomery Ward & CompanyIncorporated
Moog Incorporated
Morrison Knudsen Corporation
Morton International Incorporated
NACCO Industries Incorporated

2,095
6,262
54,000
1,754
15,699
6,000
6,900
8,800
31,622
29,000
7,052
4,200
9,171
2,200
4,300
7,600
2,100
4,300
15,099
11,000
170,000
2,084
1,000
5,700
3,060
2,000
26,799
3,500
6,513
2,781
7,870
4,496
2,300
9,099
5,432
699
26,018
7,500
30,000
6,303
1,199
4,118
6,043
5,300
519
2,399
4,280
67,200
3,287
12,559
8,400
10,724
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Nashua Corporation
National City Corporation
Newcor Incorporated
Newell Company
Noland Company
Norfolk Southern Corporation
Northrop Company
Nuvision Incorporated
Old Spaghetti Warehouse Incorporated
Oneida LTD.
Oregon Steel Hills Incorporated
Overmyer Corporation
PacifiCare Health System
Peabody Holding
Phelps Dodge Corporation
Phillips Van Heusen Corporation
Phlcorp Incorporated
Plymouth Rubber
Preston Corporation
Prime Computer Incorporated
Puerto Rican Cement Company Incorporated
Quaker Chemical Corporation
Quaker Oats Company
Quantum Chemical Corporation
R.R. Donnelly & Sons Company
Raymond Corporation
RB&W Corporation
Reading & Bates Corporation
Reliance Electric Company
Republic Automotive Parts Incorporated
Rexene Corporation
Riser Foods Incorporated
Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Company
Rorer Pharmaceutical Corporation
Rouse Company
Safeguard Scientifics Incorporated
Safety Kleen Corporation
Safeway Stores Incorporated
Salem Corporation
Sante Fe Southern Pacific
Savin Corporation
Schlumberger Limited
SCI Systems Incorporated
Selmer-Ludwig Corporation
Selas Corporation
Shawmut National Corporation
Sherwin Williams Company
Smith International Incorporated
Smithfield Foods
Somerset Group Incorporated
Sotheby's Holdings Incorporated
Southdown Incorporated

6,977
15,159
577
10,199
1,924
33,273
41,000
1,000
647
4,409
799
549
1,024
11,107
13,287
8,500
1,381
524
9,201
12,386
553
10,000
31,699
10,000
26,099
1,280
1,338
1,369
13,000
620
1,019
7,200
2,360
5,000
5,337
2,000
5,199
110,000
750
20,149
1,872
46,000
1,110
1,200
535
11,775
16,725
2,899
4,200
525
1,575
3,299
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Southland Corporation
SPS Technologies Incorporated
SPX Corporation
Square D Company
SSMC Incorporated
St. Louis Southwest Railway Company
Standard Products Company
Standard Register Company
Sterling Chemicals Incorporated
Sterling Software
Stewart & Stevenson Services Incorporated
Suave Shoe Corporation
Sundstrand Corporation
Sunshine Mining Company
Sysco Corporation
Teledyne Incorporated
Temple-Inland Incorporated
Tennant Company
Tesoro Petroleum Corporation
Thomas & Betts Corporation
TIC United Corporation
Tidewater Incorporated
Tiffany & Company
Todd Shipyards Corporation
Topps Company Incorporated
Toro Company
Tosco Corporation
Trans World Airlines Incorporated
Trinova Corporation
Trion Incorporated
Unicorp America Corporation
Union Texas Petroleum Holdings Incorporated
United Foods Incorporated
United States Shoe Corporation
USG Corporation
VWR Corporation
Watts Industries Incorporated
Weirton Steel Corporation
Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corporation
Whirlpool Corporation
Winn Dixie Stores Incorporated
Witco Corporation
WM Wrigley Jr. Company
Woodward Governor Company
WW Grainger Incorporated
Wyman Gordon Company

50,000
5,863
5,035
19,299
24,000
2,900
7,099
6,321
930
1,799
2,560
1,299
13,699
709
18,699
43,199
12,000
1,789
1,799
5,000
2,000
2,899
2,085
2,699
1,300
3,068
1,679
32,000
21,596
545
837
1,899
2,275
49,000
14,199
1,100
1,700
8,200
6,330
39,410
94,000
7,364
5,750
3,317
7,645
3,100

114

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the cop yrig ht ow ner. F urthe r rep rod uction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

APPENDIX C

COVER LETTER AND SURVEY INSTRUMENT SENT TO
REPRESENTATIVES 07 COMPANIES THAT COMMENTED ON
FASB'S EXPOSURE DRAFT ON
POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS
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EXHIBIT C-l

Date, 1991

RE: POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS
Name, Title
Corporation
Address
State, Zip
Dear Name:
Three hundred five corporations, including yours, filed
comment letters with the FASB on the exposure draft of the
statement on Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits
Other Than Pensions; almost 400 corporations of similar
industries and size did not. I am surveying corporations in
each group in an attempt to identify the factors involved in
the decision to participate in the standards setting process.
Better understanding of these factors should lead to increased
participation and improve the process in the future.
The enclosed questionnaire consists of four questions.
Please take a moment to complete the questionnaire and return
it in the enclosed envelope. Responses will be kept strictly
confidential. The results of the survey will be reported in
aggregate and I will not associate your name or your company's
name with the results that are reported.
Thank you for your participation.
Sincerely,

Christine Schalow
Assistant Professor
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EXHIBIT C-2

QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO REPRESENTATIVES OF COMPANIES TEAT
COMMENTED ON FASB'S EXPOSURE DRAFT ON POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS
OTHER THAN PENSIONS
1.

When the FASB issues an exposure draft of a proposed
statement of financial accounting standards does your
company submit written comments and/or speak at public
hearings?
(1)____ always
(2)____ only if the proposed standard is expected to
have an adverse effect on the company's
financial statements.
(3)____ other (describe below)

2.

Was your company encouraged by industry associations or
professional associations to respond to the FASB on the
OPEB issue?
yes_______

no_______

If "yes": Did this encouragement motivate your company
to respond to the FASB on the OPEB issue?
yes_______

no_______

Which association(s)?

3.

Approximately what was the number of retirees for your
firm in 1989 (if known)? ____

4.

Approximately what was the ratio
retirees for your firm in 1989:

of

employees

to

Less than two fulltime employees for every retiree ___
Two to six fulltime employees for every retiree
More than six fulltime employees for every retiree
117
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IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE A SUMMARY OF THE STATISTICAL
RESULTS, PLEASE INDICATE TO WHOM THEY SHOULD BE MAILED:

NAME
TITLE
COMPANY
ADDRESS
ADDRESS
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CONSIDERATION IN COMPLETING
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.
PLEASE RETURN IT IN THE ENCLOSED,
STAMPED SELF-ADDRESSED ENVELOPE.
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APPENDIX D

COVER LETTER AND SURVEY INSTRUMENT SENT TO
REPRESENTATIVES OF COMPANIES THAT DID NOT COMMENT ON
FASB'S EXPOSURE DRAFT ON
POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS
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EXHIBIT D-l

Date, 1991

RE: POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS
Name, Title
Corporation
Address
State, Zip
Dear Name:
Three hundred fifty nine corporations, including yours,
did not file comment letters with the FASB on the exposure
draft of the statement on Employers' Accounting for
Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions; 305 corporations
of similar industries and size did file comment letters. I am
surveying corporations in each group in an attempt to identify
the factors involved in the decision to participate in the
standards setting process.
Better understanding of these
factors should lead to increased participation and improve the
process in the future.
The enclosed questionnaire consists of six questions.
Please take a moment to complete the questionnaire and return
it in the enclosed envelope. Responses will be kept strictly
confidential. The results of the survey will be reported in
aggregate and I will not associate your name or your company's
name with the results that are reported.
Thank you for your participation.
Sincerely,

Christine schalow
Assistant Professor
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EXHIBIT D-2

QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO REPRESENTATIVES OF COMPANIES THAT
DID NOT COMMENT ON FASB'S EXPOSURE DRAFT
ON POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS
1.

Was your company, or company representative, in
agreement with the FASB's proposed accounting standard
(OPEB) that postretirement benefits other than pensions
should be accrued (ignoring implementation issues)?
yes _______

no ________

When the FASB issues an exposure draft of a proposed
statement of financial accounting standards does your
company submit written comments and/or speak at public
hearings:
(1) _____ never
(2) _____ if the proposed standard is expected to
have an adverse effect on the company's
financial statements.
(3) _____ always
(4) _____ other (describe below)

3.

Was your company encouraged by industry associations or
professional associations to respond to the FASB on the
OPEB issue?
yes _______

no

If yes, which association(s)?
Why didn't your company, or company representative,
comment on the FASB's exposure draft of postretirement
benefits other than pensions? (Please check the
appropriate reasons)
_______ We were not aware of the exposure draft.
_______ We did not believe commenting would
affect FASB's final standard.
_______ It is too costly to comment.
_______ Other (Please explain below)
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5.

Approximately what was the number of retirees for your
firm in 1989 (if known)? ____

6.

Approximately what was the ratio of employees to
retirees for your firm in 1989
Less than two fulltime employees for every retiree __
Two to six fulltime employees for every retiree

__

More than six fulltime employees for every retiree __
IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE A SUMMARY OF THE
STATISTICAL RESULTS, PLEASE INDICATE TO WHOM THEY
SHOULD BE MAILED:

NAME

TITLE

COMPANY
ADDRESS

ADDRESS
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CONSIDERATION IN COMPLETING
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. PLEASE RETURN IT IN THE ENCLOSED,
STAMPED, SELF-ADDRESSED ENVELOPE.
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to explain and classify
the behavior of corporate managers in the accounting
standards setting process as it related to Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 106.

Evidence from this

study provides readers a better understanding of
participation of corporate managers in the accounting
standards setting process.

To accomplish the objective,

this study surveyed corporate representatives who responded
to the Financial Accounting Standards Board's, February
1989, exposure draft,

"Employers' Accounting for

Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions," (OPEB).

A

sample of corporations whose representatives did not respond
to the OPEB exposure draft, although the corporations did
provide OPEB benefits, and which are of a similar industry
distribution as firms which did respond, was also surveyed.
Logistic regression analysis was used to identify
statistically significant variables in the position choice
and lobbying participation choice decisions.

No other known

study has attempted to investigate both the position and
decision to lobby on the OPEB issue, although Saemann (1987)
examined both the position and decision to lobby on
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87,
"Employer's Accounting for Pensions."
Evidence from this research provides information useful
1
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involved in setting financial accounting standards.

The

Mission Statement of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board includes the precept, "to weigh carefully the views of
its constituents in developing concepts and standards"
(FASB, 1992, p.l).

Knowledge about why corporate managers

choose to participate in the standards setting process for
postretirement benefits other than pensions provides insight
about the entire constituency of FASB, not only the
respondents.
The research hypotheses for the position choice model—
firm size, impact on financial statements, and leverage
position— were not supported by logistic regression
analysis.

Only one research hypothesis for the lobbying

participation choice model was supported in the logistic
regression analyses— the research hypothesis for firm size
for industrial companies.

The larger the number of

employees, the more likely it is that the company
participated in lobbying activities related to the OPEB
exposure draft.

The other attributes tested, maturity of

the workforce and leverage position, were found not to be
statistically significant.
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